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The purpose of this study was to assess which of a group of inde­
pendent variables were most predictive of the following dependent 
variables: (1) process power (PP), (2) process outcome (PO), and (3) 
subjective outcomes (SO) of decision making in dual-career families. 
The purposive sample consisted of 51 (N = 102) dual-career couples. 
A process-oriented model of joint decision making served as a 
basis for the questionnaires and interviews used in the study. Data 
were gathered by self-report questionnaires and a conjoint, tape-
recorded interview. The context variables—sex-role preference dis­
parity (SRD), self-esteem disparity (SED), mutuality disparity (MUD), 
marital-satisfaction disparity (MSD), income disparity (IND), educa­
tion disparity (ED), occupational-status disparity (OD), and length 
of marriage (LM)—were obtained from a self-report questionnaire. 
Couple disparity scores were calculated by the subtraction of wives' 
scores from husbands' scores on each variable except sex-role prefer­
ence disparity in which the husbands' scores were subtracted from the 
wives' scores. 
Process variables, which were collected during the interview, 
included (1) who initiated an issue, (2) the proposition which was 
made, (3) supporting strategies, (4) importance of the matter, and 
(5) response of the reactor. A process-power score for the couple 
was calculated by the response of each spouse to the other in con­
junction with a score based on the saliency of the issue. Process 
outcome was measured by spouse responses on a continuum from consen­
sus to conflict regulation. Subjective outcome was measured by 
responses on a continuum from resentment to satisfaction. 
Statistical procedures used were multiple regression and 
analysis of variance. The findings were as follows: (1) SRD was the 
best predictor of PP; the relationship was negative; (2) SRD, MUD, 
and IND were most predictive of SO; (3) SRD and IND had a significant 
positive relationship with SO; (4) MUD had a significant negative 
relationship with SO; and (5) instances in which sex-role preference 
total scores (SRPT) for the couple were high (nontraditional), 
spouses were more likely to use individualistic verbal strategies 
while negotiating or discussing about a disagreement than were 
couples with traditional scores. 
Conclusions were that the process-oriented model of decision 
making is an effective tool for the study of family interaction. In 
addition, it was suggested that sex-role preference is the single 
most important variable in the study of the process of decision 
making and that one of the most important indicators of marital power 
is marital decision making. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The 
Rapoport 
that it 
. . . has theoretical significance and empirical validity 
in three contexts: the relationship between family and 
occupation, variant patterns in the social change process, 
and sex role issues in contemporary society, (p. 1) 
The dual-career family was originally defined as: 
The type of family in which both heads of household pursue 
careers and at the same time maintain a family life together. 
The terms "career" and "family" are both somewhat imprecise, 
but the former was used to indicate sequences of occupational 
jobs which were developmental in character, and which required 
a continuous and high degree of commitment. The latter was 
arbitrarily defined as involving at least a marital pair and 
one child living as a domestic unit. (p. 3) 
According to Rapoport and Rapoport (1976), the study of dual-
career families has been criticized as being biased toward the middle 
class. In some sense, this bias is appropriate since women from the 
middle class are the most likely to involve themselves in a continu­
ous career with high commitment. Axelson (1981) claimed that the 
"relatively new phenomenon" of the dual-career family was a result of 
the feminist movement which was stimulated by Friedan's The Feminine 
Mystique. 
By the early 1970's, women were entering the labor force at a 
phenomenal rate, not only for economic reasons, but for psychological 
reasons as well. Many of these were middle-class women who, for the 
first time, were allowed the opportunity to enter professions which 
had previously been available to men only. 
term dual-career family" was coined in the early 1970's by 
and Rapoport (1978). About the concept, the authors stated 
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In the 19 70's, only seven percent of married couples fitted the 
description of the "typical American family" with father-breadwinner, 
mother-homemaker, and two children (Bird, 1979). Previously, women 
had entered the labor force as replacements for men who were fighting 
wars or to aid in services and productions related to war. This type 
of employment was usually temporary, and women were forced to return 
home when their efforts were no longer necessary. The current influx 
of women into the marketplace is thought to be permanent by some 
authorities. Bird (1979) stated her position succinctly. "This 
time women are never going home again" (p. xii). 
Certainly, the phenomenon of women's employment has and will 
continue to have economic, sociological, and political impact. The 
present study focused on the sociological consequences of dual 
careers on the family. Specifically, the process of decision 
making in dual-career families was studied. 
Decision Making as Process 
According to Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980): 
. . . the most fruitful way to understand the dynamics (what 
is going on) of male-female relations (and hence of sex, 
marriage, family, childrearing, and so on) is through sharp 
focus on sex roles and decision-making. (p. 10) 
One concludes that the emergence of dual-career families indicates 
changes in sex roles and that these changes alter the dynamics of 
family decision making. 
Hill (1965) pointed out that "during the 1960's marital decision 
making was treated as one of the most important (if not equivalent 
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to) indicators of marital power" (p. 22). This interest in "family 
power" was stimulated largely by Blood and Wolfe's (1960) Husbands 
and Wives which included their resource theory (McDonald, 1980). 
Blood and Wolfe's assertion that marital power was no longer 
based on patriarchal notions, but rather on "comparative 
resources" was a specific way of describing the long-term 
movement from fully to partially structured relationships. 
(Scanzoni, 19 79, p. 298) 
Prior to the 1960's, family power was not considered an issue 
by such reigning structural-functional theorists as Talcott Parsons. 
Power was not important, because male superiority was not only 
accepted but justified by some writers. For example, Pitts (1964) 
suggested that male superiority and dominance were functional. The 
system functioned because there was little need for conflict. Not 
only did functionalists assert that the structured family model was 
functional, but also that any deviance from it such as outside 
employment for women was detrimental to families and society. In 
other words: 
Because she is female, she is person-oriented; because she is 
subordinate, there is order; because there is order, younger 
females learn to be person-oriented and males learn to be 
task-oriented, and so the cycle continues. (Scanzoni, 1979, 
p. 297) 
Price-Bonham (1976) stated that decision making was found more 
often in the literature than other concepts related to family power. 
It was pointed out that part of the problem was that decision 
making was operationally defined as "family-power outcomes" instead 
of processes of family power. Scanzoni (1979) stated the problem 
another way: "... the most glaring and misleading of these 
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problems has been to confound relatively fixed outcomes with the com­
plex dynamic processes that exist in outcomes" (p. 307). 
McDonald (1980) presented a definition: "power is the ability 
to achieve desired goals or outcomes, whether phrased in terms of 
changing the behavior of others, or producing 'intended effects'" 
(p. 113). Zartman (1976) expanded the definition of power to include 
not only the ability to affect change, but also the ability to resist 
change. "Thus, if Actor makes fewer changes, or no changes, compared 
to Other, then Actor can be said to have greater power than Other, 
and vice versa" (Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980, p. 86). Another aspect 
of power is the importance Actor places on the matter in question. 
Cromwell and Olson (1975) divided power into three categories— 
"power bases," "power processes," and "power outcomes." Power bases 
refer to the resources participants bring to the relationship. Con­
trary to proponents of resource theory, who focused on economic 
resources, power bases include many different types of resources: 
(1) normative, (2) affective, (3) personal, and (4) cognitive. In 
this study, tangible resources (education, income, and occupational 
status), the intangible resource (self-esteem), household charac­
teristics (age, number of times married), and sex-role preference 
(degree of traditionalism/modernity regarding the role of wife, 
husband, mother, or father) were labeled context variables. 
Power processes involve the actual methods and techniques indi­
viduals use in the decision-making process. These techniques include 
the variable tactics of negotiation and persuasion which individuals 
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employ. In the present study, the assumption was made that dispari­
ties (differences between husband and wife on specified measures) in 
the variables mentioned above would affect the relative negotiating 
power of the dyad. For example, sex-role preferences have been 
demonstrated to act as "guiding philosophies" in the ways parties 
carry on discussions and negotiations. 
"Finally, the concept of power outcomes addresses the question 
of who makes the final decision or ultimately possesses the control 
. . ." (McDonald, 1980, p. 113). This definition of outcome places 
a static image on a dynamic process. To counteract this problem, the 
study defined decision-making outcomes in dynamic terms which 
symbolize a continuum of outcome possibilities from consensus through 
conflict regulation. 
Subjective outcomes indicate the parties' perceptions (feelings) 
toward objective-process outcomes of decision making. These affect 
responses deserve consideration because they become a salient issue 
in subsequent decision-making processes. 
Problem Statement and Purpose of the Study 
Concomitant with the new dual-career family lifestyle, altera­
tions in family interaction are imminent. Decision making in dual-
career families is a salient issue due to the lack of societal norms 
which exist for this type of family unit. In other words, these 
couples do not generally have "spontaneous consensus" about family 
issues. To the contrary, in dual-career families, nearly every 
aspect of family life requires the dynamics of the decision-making 
process. 
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The purpose of the study was to address the following research 
questions: (1) among measured disparities in context variables and 
mutuality scores, which are most predictive of the relative 
negotiating power or relative discussion power in dual-career marital 
dyads? (2) Among measured disparities in context variables, mutual­
ity scores, and relative negotiating power or relative discussion 
power, which are most predictive of decision-making process outcomes 
in the dual-career marital dyad? and (3) Among measured disparities 
in context variables, mutuality scores, relative negotiating power 
or relative discussion power, and process outcomes, which are most 
predictive of decision-making subjective outcomes in the dual-career 
marital dyad? 
Propositions 
First, one concludes from the literature the proposition that 
decision making is a dynamic ongoing process, which is facilitated 
by negotiation and reflects the power participants possess according 
to the various resources they claim for themselves which are recog­
nized and accepted by others. Second, the most appropriate way to 
assess marital decision making is to study dyadic interaction. 
Third, the personal conjoint interview in the home is an optimal 
setting for the naturalization of methods and procedures. These 
propositions served as a basis for the rationale and plan of this 
research. 
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Operational Definitions 
Decision making is a dynamic ongoing process which involves the 
exchange of tangible and intangible resources. The process is 
facilitated by negotiation and reflects the power participants 
possess according to the various resources they claim for themselves 
which are recognized and accepted by others. 
Process power is the relative ability of the members of a dyad 
to affect or resist change in relation to the individual salience 
of the matter. 
Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) defined outcome as: 
"how parties . . . evaluate changes (or lack of them). Outcome is 
also how persons assess continuing discussion/negotiations aimed at 
either change or constancy" (p. 101). 
Subjective outcomes are spouses' perceptions (feelings indi­
cated) of the negotiation process and objective outcomes of decision 
making. 
Tangible resource variables are defined as (1) education (the 
highest level of school attained, i.e., number of years); (2) occupa­
tion (defined and coded according to the Duncan Occupational Scale) 
(Steven & Featherman, 1981); and (3) income (annual gross salary). 
Intangible resource variable is self-esteem (the way people 
evaluate themselves) . 
Sex-role preference is the desired goals or interests concerning 
specific rewards and costs related to division of labor and sex 
stratification. 
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Household characteristics are age, number of marriages, and 
length of marriage. 
Marital satisfaction is an individual's perceptions of the 
contentment felt for the marital relationship. 
Mutuality is an individual's evaluation of prior decision making 
with spouse. 
Disparities are the differences in spouses' tangible resources, 
intangible resources, sex-role preference scores, and mutuality 
scores. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
The major strength of the study was that it assessed the process 
of decision making, whereas the majority of previous research in this 
area has relied on static final-say techniques to measure a dynamic 
process. The use of self-report and tape-recorded interaction data 
contributed to the strength of the research. Verbatim transcriptions 
of recorded interviews reduced problems of instrumentation to a mini­
mum. In addition, the marital dyad was viewed and treated as a 
decision-making unit in lieu of separate individuals' making uni­
lateral decisions. This was claimed to be an improvement over 
previous research in which wife's responses alone were used to mea­
sure dyad decision-making outcomes. 
The primary limitation of the study was the nonrandom nature of 
the sample. Caution should be exercised in the generalization of 
findings. The fact that all of the wives in the study were members 
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of a professional women's club or the Junior League may have created 
biases. 
It should be noted that the usual limitations of the personal 
interview, such as social desirability, were a concern. The belief 
was that the presence of both spouses encouraged honesty and openness 
which would counteract this problem. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Methodological Issues in Decision-
Making Research 
Research studies about family power have been abundant, but 
aside from the conceptual problems mentioned in Chapter I, some of 
the methodological techniques used by researchers have caused 
findings to be suspect. According to McDonald (1980), concerns 
about methodologies center around the following: (1) the comparison 
of unequal decision-making and power phenomena, (2) measurement 
techniques needed for power processes instead of reliance on decision­
making outcomes, (3) whether wife's responses alone are adequate 
indicators of husband-wife responses, (4) the need for observational 
techniques of family power, and (5) problems with the Blood and 
Wolfe-type measures. 
Comparison of Unequal Decision-
Making and Power Phenomena 
Price-Bonham (19 76) projected concern that studies have often 
given equal weight to all decisions which resulted in a final deci­
sion-making score. Thus, a study was conducted to investigate 
discrepancies in weighted and unweighted decision-making scores. 
The 280 respondents (140 couples) were interviewed separately. 
Participants were asked to describe their decision-making behavior, 
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as well as their attitudes toward the importance of decisions. Vari­
ous resources which were held by subjects were treated as independent 
variables in the correlational analyses. Results were that although 
no differences were found in weighted and unweighted scores related 
to resources using simple correlation, stepwise regression indicated 
that "resources do have differential influence on the DM [decision 
making] and DMI [decision-making plus importance scores]" (p. 639). 
Process versus Outcomes 
Several writers have emphasized the problem of researchers' reli­
ance on outcomes for the measurement of power (McDonald, 1980; 
Scanzoni, 1979). A primary reason for this is that processes are 
very difficult to measure. Specifically, the majority of studies 
have been patterned after the Blood and Wolfe (1960) model of "who 
decided what." Several social scientists have attempted to remedy 
the situation (cf. McDonald, 1980, for citations). The most process-
oriented model has been presented by Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and 
used as a research instrument by Hill (1981). 
The Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) model of explicit marital nego­
tiation encompasses the enormous complexities involved in process 
outcomes. The model (see Figure 1), first of all, takes into con­
sideration four clusters of context variables: (1) compositional 
(race, age, number and ages of children, years married, sequence of 
marriage), (2) resource (education, employment status, income, work-
time, negotiation and bargaining experience, and skills), (3) 
"orientations governing bargaining power" (self-esteem, sex-role 
Bargaining Processes Outcomes Social Context 
Composition 
Resources 
Position Modifications Orientations governing 
bargaining power 
Consensus-
Dissensus Actor's orientations 
to Other's past 
bargaining behaviors 
Strategies and Tactics 
Source: Scanzoni, J., & Polonko, K. A conceptual approach to explicit marital negotiation. 
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1980, 42^ 31-44. 
Figure 1. A model of explicit marital negotiation. 
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preferences, investment in the issue, importance of the issue), and 
(4) "Actor's orientations regarding Other's past bargaining behav­
iors" (Other's cooperative bargaining, trust in Other, fairness and 
equitable manner of Other, Other understands and communicates well, 
Actor's resentment toward Other). The lower level of the model 
demonstrates that "outcome a" affects "b" and that "a" and "b" then 
affect "c," and so on. The important concept here is that outcome 
and process are ongoing and that previous negotiation experiences are 
influential on present and future ones. 
The next sequence in the model has to do with bargaining posi­
tions and strategies of Actor and Other. Variations in the four con­
text variables just described indicated the bargaining position of 
the party which infers their relative power. 
"Strategies" or "tactics" or "bargaining behaviors" are those 
acts, whether appropriate or inappropriate, which facilitate Actor 
and Other's OVER cost-reward ratios. Figure 1 illustrates the corre­
lation of bargaining positions and strategies. Outcomes are demon­
strated in the model to be separate from processes. However, it was 
stated that in actuality the "two phenomena make up an intrinsic 
whole" (p. 40). Nevertheless, when the dynamics within the first 
part of the model cease, some type of social pattern emerges (out­
comes). Several different types of outcomes are possible: consensus 
(Actor feels he/she has a "fair exchange") or dissensus (Actor dis­
agrees) . Dissensus may be accompanied by cessation or quasi-cessation 
of negotiation. In the former, Other's strategies are regulating in 
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lieu of resolving conflict, while the latter is akin to a "stalemate" 
whereby Other refuses to negotiate further while Actor continues to 
attempt modifications. Other outcomes, of course, are possible such 
as the dyad may suggest that they still do not have an agreement or 
disagreement. In this case: 
It would nonetheless be possible to measure the degree of 
symmetrical bargaining power exercised thus far in the 
course of the issue by assessing the modifications and 
concessions each had made up to this point in time. (p. 41) 
Wife's Responses as Indicators 
of Power 
McDonald (1980) stated that several researchers have found dis­
crepancies in husbands' and wives' responses. Nevertheless, the 
majority of the power research has relied on wives' responses only. 
Safilios-Rothschild (1969) was critical of the use of this research 
method when she stated: 
The majority of studies have assumed—without having tested 
this assumption with respect to all family variables—that 
the two sets of responses are quite similar and, consequently, 
have based their conclusions and generalizations solely on the 
responses of the wife. (p. 290) 
Safilios-Rothschild (1969) conducted a study which examined United 
States and Greek husbands' and wives' decision-making scores, and 
found distinct differences in perceptions. Conclusions were that 
reliance on the wife's point of view alone was neither valid nor 
adequate. 
To summarize, although a large number of methodological techni­
ques have been used to study family power and decision making, the 
focus has been on outcomes instead of processes, and the data have 
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been biased by reliance on the wife's .point of view, and replete of 
the perceptions of other family members. In addition, problems per­
sist in the use of unweighted scores and overall decision-making 
scores for the husband-wife dyad. Lastly, the use of self-report 
data collection instead of observational methods has been criticized. 
Conclusions are in agreement with Berardo (1980): "Many of the 
pressing problems [in power research] noted in the decade review of 
the sixties continue to remain unresolved throughout the seventies" 
(p. 3). 
Theoretical Considerations in Decision Making 
Resource Theory 
According to Scanzoni (19 79), most American and European research 
is in accord with Blood and Wolfe's (1960) "resource theory," which 
stated that "the power of husband varies positively with his socio­
economic resources (income, education, occupational prestige, or a 
composite of these variables") (p. 298). It was also pointed out 
that wife's participation in the labor force has been empirically 
found to enhance her power, while decreasing that of her husband. 
On the other hand, some researchers have found that increases 
in husband's economic resources either decreased or had no effect on 
his power (Scanzoni, 1979). Other findings cited were that wife's 
employment had no influence on her power. 
Rodman postulated a "normative-resource theory" model which was 
an expansion of resource theory (McDonald, 1980). The theory was 
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based on the assumption that marital power is affected by not only 
the resources of the marital dyad, but also cultural norms concerning 
marital power. Burr et al. (1977) posited several propositions which 
combined resource theory with normative resource theory to predict a 
correlation between resources and decision making. After testing 
several of the propositions, the researchers found that in opposition 
to Rodman's hypothesis, resources were strongly related to power when 
norms concerning authority were more patriarchal than egalitarian. 
Kandel and Lesser (1972) conducted a study "to test the theory 
of resources on American and Danish urban families" (p. 134). 
Although the research was limited by some of the methodological pro­
blems mentioned in the previous section, some of the findings were 
worthy of note and appropriate to the dual-career family which is the 
focus of the present paper. Marital power was found to be "neither 
consistently nor always positively correlated with the resources 
brought into the marriage by each spouse" (p. 135). Husbands with 
lower educational levels than wives had less power than wives, while 
husbands who had more education than wives or the same level, 
whether high or low, had more power. When the wife was employed 
full-time or part-time, the husband had less power. Husbands with 
the highest power had wives who worked full-time in the home. The 
researchers speculated that this finding could indicate that the 
important variable for wife's power was her contact with the "out­
side" which would afford her "opportunities to gain experience in 
interpersonal and decision-making skills outside the family setting" 
(p. 137). 
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Social-Exchange Theory 
McDonald (1980) asserted that "social exchange theory has become 
the predominant orientation in family power and decision-making 
research" (p. 117). It was stated that Scanzoni has made the great­
est contribution to the relation of exchange theory to power in 
families. 
Decision making is problem solving and may also take the form of 
conflict resolution. At the very basis of exchange theory as it 
relates to decision making is the assumption that "human beings are 
actors as well as reactors. They make decisions and initiate action 
rather than having them predetermined by their culture/milieu" (Nye, 
19 79, p. 7). In addition, all individuals act and react in ways that 
maximize rewards and minimize costs. This assumption would be inade­
quate as it stands for the interpretation of decision-making behaviors 
in families, because often rewards to one family member are costly to 
another. 
The concept of maximum joint profit (MJP) is based on the assump­
tion that actors are willing to negotiate for the interest of the 
group in lieu of individual profits (Scanzoni, 1979). MJP also 
rewards the individuals within the family, and in this light, is 
profitable for the individual family members. Consequently, MJP 
serves as an incentive for the negotiation process in decision 
making. 
The pattern of social exchange is different from an economic 
perspective. In terms of Goul.dner's principle of reciprocity: 
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Complete repayment is almost never reached in social exchange 
.... The ongoing inputs stimulate increased feelings of 
mutual gratitude and recitude, thus contributing to mainten­
ance and stability of social systems. (Scanzoni, 1979, p. 307) 
Scanzoni (1979) stated that trust is an important ingredient in 
the decision-making process. Actors react very differently, to each 
other when trust is present as contrasted with distrust. Trust indi-
ciates Actor's confidence of receiving rewards from Other, while 
mistrust has inherent expectations of costs from Other. Ultimately, 
trust may instigate the emergence of nonlegitimate power if Actor 
reverts to coercion to force Other to react in the desired manner. 
The social exchange theory concept of comparison level (CL) and 
comparison level alternatives (CL ALT) is relevant to family decision 
making. For example, in the negotiation process, one is more likely 
to feel equity exists if the calculation of CL reveals that he 
is getting his "just deserts." A similar reaction results from the 
calculation of CL ALT and the eventual weighting of decisions. 
Sex-Role Model of Decision Making 
Time was when decision making in families was extremely struc­
tured. In the Parsonian model of instrumental and expressive roles 
for spouses up until the 1960's, there was little need for a dynamic 
mode of decision making. The Ekehian concept of spontaneous consen­
sus was the "accepted order of the day." 
. Along with the activistic 1960's came changes in family dynamics 
which had far-reaching implications for the decision-making process. 
Gender-role norms, as viewed by Scanzoni (1979), "may be measured on 
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a continuum ranging from 'traditional' to 'modern'" (p. 305). The 
traditional end of the spectrum in the sense of "spontaneous consen­
sus" consists of a hierarchy in which husband's occupation is on top. 
This structure gives the husband's interest top priority with the 
children often coming next, followed lastly by those of the woman. 
Without question, husbands in this type of structure hold legitimate 
power. However, as one moves down the continuum toward the modern, 
the more power becomes negotiable. Scanzoni emphasized the point: 
"Modernity" characterizes situations in which the interests 
of the woman are equal in significance to those of husband 
and any children. Moreover, these interests generally 
include serious occupational involvement, (p. 305) 
Consequently, one concludes that women who have a high degree of 
commitment to an occupation are more likely to have a modern in lieu 
of a traditional sex-role orientation. By the same token, husbands 
who have spouses with careers would also be expected to have a modern 
orientation. 
Scanzoni (1980) developed a sex-role preference framework which 
incorporated sex-role orientations (preferences for desired goals or 
interests) (p. 17) with "sex stratification" ("the idea that men and 
women are systematically funneled into social positions that provide 
greater amounts of valued rewards (tangible and intangible) to men 
than to women" (p. 16)) and the division of labor by sex (men gain 
status in the public sphere which gives them the power to maintain 
the stratification status quo while women remain in the private 
sphere where they gain no public status and control). Scanzoni's 
sex-role preference inventory is a Likert-type scale which gives a 
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combined score to indicate whether the person has a sex-role prefer­
ence of modern or traditional. 
Evidence exists which indicates sex-role preference may directly 
or indirectly affect women's career involvement. For example, 
Scanzoni (1980) pointed out that "The more years of school people 
have, the more likely they are to hold modern or egalitarian prefer­
ences" (p. 19). Since women with more education are more likely to 
be committed to careers, one would hypothesize that women who hold 
careers are more likely to have a modern sex-role preference. 
Based on other research, Scanzoni (1980) also reported that 
women have a stronger egalitarian preference than men. Consequently, 
one would postulate that women who have careers would have a stronger 
egalitarian preference than their husbands, even though career women 
probably have more egalitarian husbands than do noncareer women. 
Scanzoni (1980) conducted a study to test the validity of the 
conceptualization of three contemporary marriage types: 
Husband as head and wife as complement [wife not employed]; 
husband as senior partner and wife as junior partner [wife 
employed,.but considers husband major provider]; husband 
and wife each as equal partners [husband and wife copro-
viders]. (p. 125) 
In the area of sex-role preference, equal partners favored more 
egalitarian marital roles for wives and husbands than did junior 
partners, and they in turn preferred egalitarianism more than did 
complement wives. From these findings, one can speculate that dual-
career wives would have a more egalitarian sex-role preference than 
would dual-wage-earner wives, and that dual-wage-earner wives would 
prefer egalitarian roles more than would unemployed wives. 
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Dual-Career Families; An Overview 
As has been illustrated thus far, concomitant with the demise of 
structure-functionalism, decision-making and power processes have 
come to the forefront of marital relationships in at least the last 
two decades as large numbers of women entered the labor force. As a 
result of the women's movement, the advent of the "pill," and reduced 
fertility, women have sought employment quite different from the 
supplemental type of years past. With increased educational and 
occupational opportunities, women have begun to seek long-term career 
commitments. Concomitant with the new dual-career families, altera­
tions in the dynamics of family interaction are eminent. At the very 
core of the changes inherent in the dual-career system is a new 
emphasis on gender-role norms and decision-making processes. This 
study focused on these issues from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. 
Decision Making in Dual-Career Families 
Decision-making issues of dual-career couples which have received 
the primary focus of writers' attentions have concerned the division 
of household tasks, child care, and the decision for the wife to be­
come and remain employed. The following section outlines some of the 
research findings related to these issues and presents pertinent 
theory. 
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Dual-Career Choice 
According to Railings and Nye (19 79), levels of the employment 
of women are affected by the following factors at the microlevel: 
health, abilities, motivations, and completing household responsibil­
ities ; and those which involve situational factors in the social 
environment, e.g., level of family income. Certainly women who 
choose the type of career which involves long-term commitment are 
influenced by many of these factors. However, the decision making 
for this group is much more complex than that for the "two-paycheck" 
family where women often work part-time or go in and out of the job 
market as children enter the family or are launched. The complexity 
of the problem implies that the decision-making process .necessary for 
resolution is also complicated and hence requires negotiation by the 
spouses. 
Certainly, the woman's career decision is more than a one-sided 
issue. St. John-Parsons (19 78) quoted Bailyn: 
" . . .  a n  e d u c a t e d ,  m a r r i e d  w o m a n ' s  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
career-family dilemma cannot be adequately evaluated 
without knowledge of her husband's resolution of the way 
he fits his work and his family into his life" (p. 9 7) 
It has been suggested that the woman who has more power would be more 
likely to seek employment (Hoffman, 1960). In other words, the hus­
band's point of view is more or less influential in view of the rela­
tive power of both participants. For example, a husband may prefer 
that his wife be unemployed, because he feels that he "should" be 
the "breadwinner" and that her employment depletes his 
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socially accepted role. Therefore, in this case if the wife chooses 
to work in spite of her husband's feelings, then she can be assumed 
to have more power than he. 
Arnott (1972) pointed out that at least four types have become 
common in women-family work roles—full-time homemaking or dual 
marriage work roles such as volunteer work, study for a degree, or 
employment (full-time or part-time). One of the most salient ways 
to view this decision is in the context of exchange theory. 
The Exchange Perspective 
In accord with exchange theory, the underlying assumption is 
that those couples who choose a dual-career lifestyle do so because 
the rewards outweigh the costs, and hence, enhance overall profits. 
On the surface, the most usual rewards of which one thinks in regard 
to employment are financial. Although obviously career women can 
expect to earn higher incomes than those of the "two-paycheck variety" 
or the unemployed, St. Johns-Parsons (19 78) pointed out that the dual-
career pattern was not always financially rewarding due to the high 
costs of child care and other services required when both spouses are 
employed. 
In addition, dual-career women are most often married to men who 
have relatively high salaries so that it is unlikely that the women 
choose to work for financial rewards alone. In support of this idea, 
Rapoport and Rapoport (1978) quoted from the work of several authors: 
"three in five American working wives would work even if they had 
enough money to live comfortably without working" (p. 3). 
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Arnott (19 72) related a woman's choice to be employed or non-
employed to the concept of comparison levels and comparison-level 
alternatives. The author postulated that in a voluntary sense, 
women enter marriage with the expectation of rewards, and: 
will be a fulltime homemaker if no alternative situation 
offers still greater profit. In a voluntary situation, 
the woman will remain in a role that does not provide 
minimal profit of CL and/or CL ALT, or will leave one 
that does. (p. 124). 
Arnott (19 72) conducted a study which substantiated these concepts. 
Findings were that "when role choice is voluntary, married women 
choose that role which maximizes their profit. (2) When role choice 
is nonvoluntary, they will be found in social roles which do not 
maximize profit" (p. 124). 
Another consideration is that what constitutes a reward differs 
from one person to another. Both Bebbington (1973) and St. Johns-
Parsons (19 78) looked at the backgrounds of dual-career couples as 
motivating factors in the dual-career choice. It can be assumed that 
one's background has some influence on what one finds rewarding. For 
example, one who was reared in an environment where women were 
expected to fulfill the traditional roles of women may find the idea 
of having a career aversive in lieu of rewarding. 
Bebbington (1973), as well as St. Johns-Parsons (1978), found 
several trends in the types of childhoods experienced by dual-career 
participants. Bebbington's (1973) findings concerning dual-career 
wives were as follows: 
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(1) only or eldest children; (2) no other adults in child­
hood family setting; (3) work-oriented mother; (4) tension 
in one's relationship with father; (5) prolonged separation 
from parents during childhood, or other disturbing experi­
ences; (6) relatively high social class, gauged by father's 
occupation. (p. 533) 
Few differences were found in husbands' backgrounds, although there 
was some evidence that they had a close relationship with their 
mothers during childhood. 
St. Johns-Parsons' (1978) results were that (1) women were only 
children; (2) when siblings were present, the numbers were few; (3) 
where siblings were same sex, there was sibling rivalry; (4) wives 
came from families in which there was tension; (5) husbands did not 
come from tense backgrounds; (6) husbands came from a lower social 
class than did wives; and (7) husbands had strong self-images. 
One could speculate that only-children women are career-oriented 
as a result of their high-achievement orientation. Since these indi­
viduals are achievement-oriented, they would be more likely to find 
a career rewarding than would those who are not oriented toward high 
achievement. They would also be more willing to accept the costs 
which accompany dual-career roles. 
The husband's reward/cost ratios are more difficult to discern. 
For some, certainly the relief from the total financial burden would 
be rewarding. Rapoport's (1978) study suggested that the husband's 
close relationship with mother may encourage him to be empathetic 
with the needs of his wife. In exchange terms, he has been rewarded 
for being supportive of women, and consequently, finds being 
supportive rewarding. 
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The costs involved in the dual-career system are numerous, and 
have received the attention of several researchers (Bebbington, 19 73; 
Rapoport & Rapoport, 1978; St. Johns-Parsons, 1978). One of the most 
studied costs has been stress. Almost every aspect of the dual-
career lifestyle has the potential for stress, far greater stress 
than the "spontaneous consensus" traditional-style relationship. A 
lai-ge portion of the stress is brought on because of the necessity 
to negotiate often, about almost every aspect of running a home. 
Other costs include loss of time, work-overload, less contact 
with kin-network, and environmental sanctions (St. Johns-Parsons, 
1978). In spite of the large numbers of costs experienced by dual-
career couples, the rewards outweigh them as is evidenced by the 
ever-increasing numbers who have chosen to join this new family style. 
Conclusions are that exchange theory is very applicable to the deci­
sion-making process and outcome of whether both spouses will share 
work/family roles. 
Decision Making About the Division 
of Household Tasks 
The division of household labor has received more attention from 
researchers than perhaps any other aspect of dual-career families. 
One would assume that women who have the power to work on the one 
hand would have the power to share with husbands household tasks and 
child care on the other. Numerous researchers have looked at the 
issue of the division of household labor (Erickson et al., 1979; 
27 
Faikas, 1976; Leln, 1979; Perrucci et al., 1978; Pleck, 1979; Yogev, 
1981). Most agree that career women spend a great deal more time in 
housework and child care than do their spouses. The consequence of 
this inequality in shared tasks is a work overload for the career 
wife. Decision making about the division of household labor can best 
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be viewed from the perspectives of sex-role theory and resource 
theory. 
Sex-Role Theory 
According to the Rapoports (19 78), "the current situation is 
that most families are dual-worker families at some point in the 
family cycle, and that the pattern is becoming 'normalized'" (p. 3). 
Along with this normalization is the changing view of sex roles from 
traditional to the more modem type mentioned earlier in this paper. 
One simply cannot discuss dual-career families without including sex-
role changes for the two are inseparable. Dual-career families never 
could have evolved without at least some sex-role changes. 
Hoffman (1960) pointed out: 
The increased participation of fathers in routine household 
tasks, a change in power relations from male dominance toward 
husband-wife equality, and corresponding changes in ideology 
about sex roles in the family . . . can be seen as mutually 
reinforcing, (p. 27) 
Certainly, all three of these changes influence decision making in 
dual-career families. 
Hoffman (1960) conducted a study to investigate the effects of 
wife's employment on household tasks sharing, decision making, and 
family power. The study was limited, because the data were collected 
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from mothers and children only, excluding fathers, and decision mak­
ing was measured in terms of outcomes. Findings were that (1) when 
women work, fathers participate more in housework and wives less; 
(2) working mothers have less control of decision making in household 
tasks; and (3) employed mothers have more power than do nonworking 
mothers. Conclusions were that employment affects power structure 
indirectly by interaction "with the pre-existing ideologies and 
personalities of the actors" (Hoffman, 1960, p. 35). These results 
support the influence of sex-role theory in relation to resources and 
power in families. 
On the other hand, Weingarten (19 78) found no differences in 
family work by women who were employed professionally versus those 
unemployed. Concerning the division of labor between dual-career 
couples, the author suggested: 
That couples "negotiate" a division of labor that allows 
women to compensate for the time they spend away from the 
children and men to choose the family work that is less 
threatening to their masculine selves. (p. 43) 
Lein (19 79) concluded from intensive interview data from 25 
families that several factors related to role theory influence the 
husband's participation in family roles: (1) husbands perceive the 
breadwinner role as their primary function; (2) husbands and wives 
have difficulty sharing their primary roles; (3) pressures from out­
side the family inhibit change in family-role responsibilities; and 
(4) men's support systems reinforce traditional roles. 
Perrucci et al. (19 78) tested three hypotheses concerning the 
division of household/child-care labor: (1) resources which 
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indicated power, (2) sex-role ideology, and (3) time availability. 
Results were that the sex-role ideology variable had more influence 
on husbands' task performance than did the other two, regardless of 
wife's employment. Limited support was found for the relative-
resource hypothesis. 
Yogev (1981) suggested that, similar to Young and Willmott's 
idea that families are becoming more symmetrical (husbands are more 
involved in family roles; wives are more involved in work outside the 
home; consequently, both husbands and wives have two roles), several 
researchers have concluded that as wives become employed, husbands' 
household labor increased. 
Others have found that division of household labor is quite 
conventional in the dual-career family (Perrucci et al., 1978; 
Weingarten, 19 78). A traditional division of household tasks implies 
a traditional power distribution in favor of husbands. 
Not only are there differences in the contributions to household 
tasks, but also in the numbers of hours devoted to careers weekly. 
Yogev's (1981) research showed that husbands spent an average of 9.4 
more hours than did wives on their careers where children were pre­
sent, while for childless couples, the difference was only 1.5 hours. 
However, the tradeoff in career/housework hours was not equal. Wives 
who had children reported their husbands spent 16.0 hours less than 
they did in housework and 23.1 fewer hours in child care, while 
childless wives claimed their husbands spent 12.1 fewer hours in 
housework. 
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These findings seem to indicate that husbands hold more power 
than do wives, especially where children are involved. One explana­
tion for the acceptance of this pattern by dual-career wives is that 
many of the wives stated that they did not believe that their hus­
bands were not doing their share and that they did not expect an 
egalitarian pattern. In other words, the wives thought the unequal 
roles enabled them to continue in their traditional roles as the 
"mothers of the families." 
When these same women were asked whether they thought themselves 
equal to their husbands in intelligence and ability to handle things, 
the majority believed they were equal. Therefore, the wives saw 
themselves as having an egalitarian relationship with their husbands 
in attitude, but not in behavior (Yogev, 1981). It was suggested 
that perhaps the reason for these discrepancies is that these women 
were reared under the traditional sex-role ideologies, and have no 
societal models for their new dual-career roles. 
Pleck (19 79) reported that Blood and Wolfe (1960) : 
Concluded that husbands' relatively low contribution to 
household work did not derive from traditional ideology 
about family roles. Rather, they argued, husbands' low 
contribution is a rational response to the fact that 
husbands have fewer resources, particularly time, with 
which to perform these tasks, (p. 483). 
Pleck (19 79) stated that Walker and Woods, in their 1976 
pioneering study concerning male family work, found that men spent 
1.6 hours per day in household work and childcare, while wives spent 
8.1 hours, and working wives spent 4.8 hours. Contrary to the con­
clusions of Blood and Wolfe (1960), that as women went to work and 
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gained more resources, men contributed more to family work, the 
Walker and Woods' studies showed that men with employed wives did 
not contribute more time to household tasks than did those with 
nonemployed wives. 
Pleck (19 79) analyzed data from a 19 77 national sample to inves­
tigate time spent by men and women on household chores and child 
care. Findings were supportive of the data that family roles are 
changing. Men who had working wives spent 1.8 hours per week more 
in household tasks, and 2.7 more hours per week in child care than 
did husbands with nonemployed wives. Conclusions were that this 
changing-role perspective for men's family work, although not as 
prevalent as the traditional-role view that no change is needed or 
the exploitation perspective that little hope exists for changing 
roles, that it is likely to increase in importance in family studies. 
To summarize, in regard to sex-role and resource theory relative 
to decision making in dual-career families, the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive. Most researchers agree that dual-career wives spend 
much more time and have the primary responsibility for household 
tasks and child care. This inequality may indicate that husbands 
control the power in these areas. 
Some researchers found that, although inequality existed, 
employed wives participate less in family work and husbands contri­
bute more (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Hoffman, 1960; Pleck, 19 79), thus 
indicating an increase in power for employed wives versus nonemployed 
wives. Conflicting results were postulated by Weingarten (19 78) and 
32 
Perrucci et al. (19 78) who found no differences in the division of 
labor between employed and nonemployed wives. 
Evidence exists that sex-role ideologies affect the division of 
labor in dual-career families. Some researchers (Hoffman, 1960; 
Lein, 1979; Perrucci et al., 1978; Pleck, 1979; Yogev, 1981) have 
demonstrated that couples who have a modern sex-role ideology are 
more likely to share family work, although not equally. Most authors 
agree that the inequality is due to outside societal pressures for 
the participants to function in their traditional roles, lack of 
models for dual-career role sharing, and internalized role expecta­
tions for self and spouse. 
Conclusion 
The dual-career family is a family style which has evolved in 
the last two decades and will continue to grow in the future. Deci­
sion making in dual-career families is an ongoing process which 
requires constant negotiation. Those wives who have adequate 
resources and modern sex-role ideology are more likely to have the 
power to negotiate for the dual-career lifestyle. Couples who both 
have a modern sex-role ideology are more likely to get MJP from the 
dual-career lifestyle. 
Decision-making research on dual-career families has concen­
trated on the division of household labor and child care. The evi­
dence is nonconclusive. Most researchers agree that wives still 
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carry the primary responsibility for family work, but some researchers 
have found that employed wives have husbands who make contributions. 
Consensus of opinion is that employed wives have more power than do 
nonemployed wives. 
Social-exchange theory provides the most salient perspective for 
decision making in dual-career families. Those couples who choose a 
dual-career lifestyle do so because the rewards outweigh the costs, 
and hence, enhance overall profits. Sex-role ideologies and 
resources affect what individuals find rewarding or cost-provoking. 
The issue of decision making in dual-career families is a timely 
one, which is far from clear, based on current empirical evidence. 
Researchers can make a contribution to this salient issue by focusing 
on this aspect of dual careers in the future. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS OF PROCEDURE 
Subjects 
A purposive sample of 51 (N = 102) married, dual-career couples 
was used for this study. Wives were contacted through membership in 
a professional business women's group. Only those women who were 
married and currently living with spouses were asked to participate. 
Other criteria for participation were that both spouses had a high 
level of continuous commitment to a professional career. The 100 
group members unanimously agreed to involvement in the study; 50 of 
these were eligible, based on the above criteria. 
Letters of orientation (Appendix A) were sent to the 50 couples 
who were eligible. In order to set up a date for the couple inter­
view, interviewers initiated contact by telephone approximately one 
week after the letters were mailed. Eleven of the 50 potential sub­
jects could not be contacted due to absence for business travels or 
changed addresses. 
Consequently, to add to the size of the sample, the Junior League 
of Greensboro was contacted and 14 couples from that group who met 
the dual-career criteria volunteered to join the study. The total 
sample included 51 (N = 102) dual-career couples who resided in the 
area of Greensboro, North Carolina. 
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Data Collection 
Interviewers were trained by the primary researcher in a group-
training session prior to data collection. Before the interview 
began, interviewers reassured participants of the confidentiality of 
questionnaires and tape-recorded materials. Interviews, which lasted 
approximately one and one-half hours, were carried out in the parti­
cipants' homes. The introductory letter (Appendix A) had forewarned 
subjects not to discuss the interview with other subjects until all 
data had been collected. 
The first step in the procedure was the completion of the confi­
dential questionnaire (Appendix B) by both spouses separately. To 
contribute to internal validity, the first page of the questionnaire, 
which served as an introduction, was read to the couple by the 
interviewer. In the interest of privacy, spouses were instructed to 
go to separate rooms to complete the instrument and were further 
instructed to refrain from communication about questions or answers.. 
After the confidential questionnaires were completed, the couple 
rejoined the interviewer for the conjoint tape-recorded interview 
(Appendix C). The interview form served as an absolute guide for the 
interview as it was designed to address all possible answers. (For 
an example, see Questions l.A and l.B.) The final stage of the pro­
cedure was for spouses to complete the closing questionnaire (Appen­
dix D) separately and privately. This concluded the session. 
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Research Instruments and Measures 
Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) 
presented a process-oriented model of joint decision making which is 
eclectic in its use of ideas from symbolic interaction, social 
exchange, and social conflict theories. The model has two purposes: 
(1) to analyze decision making, and (2) "to describe why changes in 
sex roles continue to alter the character of family decision making" 
(p. 13). The focus of the joint decision-making model is on the 
dyad as a unit. The model is especially useful in studying power 
relationships in lieu of previous ones which have viewed power as 
outcomes. 
The operational definition of decision making used in the model 
is as follows: 
Family members have items (tangible and intangible) they 
wish to give to and also receive from each other. Simul­
taneously, family members want to give and receive 
(exchange) items with parts of the larger society. The 
capability of engaging in one of those kinds of exchanges 
usually depends on the capability of doing the other as 
well. Organizing those exchanges in an orderly and satis-
* factory fashion is what decision-making is all about. 
(Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980, p. 13) 
The model is dynamic in that it is based on Gulliver's (19 79) 
notions of the repetitive cyclical and developmental sequences of 
negotiations. Gulliver (19 79) defined negotiation as a process of 
information exchange, learning, and assessment. It was suggested 
that within negotiation, repletive cycles of information exchange and 
assessment aid negotiation to move forward toward consensus and imple­
mentation. 
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Hill and Scanzoni (1982) proposed that a six-point process-
oriented general frameworkwas "applicable to a wide range of family-
related decision-making issues" (p. 8). The framework, which is of 
recent design, was used by Hill (1981) in a study of decision making 
by couples who had received training in communication skills. Hill 
(1981) stated that the model claims conceptual and theoretical 
validity based on its derivation from several well known and accepted 
theories. 
The six points of the framework are the following. First, the 
cyclical and developmental sequences of the process of decision mak­
ing are dissected and identified into units. Second, the units are 
scrutinized to determine connected events. The third step is to 
view the units in developmental terms. A fourth step involves the 
unity of the developmental and cyclical processes. The "identifica­
tion of outcome flowing from process represents a fifth" step. The 
sixth and final step integrates "past decision-making history with 
present processes and outcomes" (Hill & Scanzoni, 1982, p. 7). 
In summary, the joint decision-making model illustrates the 
effects of context factors and evaluation of prior decision making 
on processes, outcomes, and future decision making (see Figure 2). 
Process Variables 
The process of decision making has been conceptualized as a 
series of cyclical and developmental units (Gulliver, 1979; Scanzoni 
& Szinovacz, 1980). Figure 3 illustrates the steps and sequences of 
the possible units in the decision-making process. Process variables 
Evaluation or Prior 
Decisioning 
1. Other's cooperative 
bargaining 
2. Trust in Other 
3. Fairness and equitable 
manner of Other 
4. Empathy of Other toward 
Actor 
Current Context Factors 
Tangible resources 
(education, occupation," 
income) 
Self-esteem 
Sex-role preferences 
Household characteristics 
(age, number of years 
married, number of 
marriages, race) 
Marital satisfaction 
\ 
Decisioning Process 
1. Consensus 
2. Change 
3. Conflict 
4. Discussion 
5. Negotiation 
6. Power 
Outcome (Subse­
quent Decision 
Making) 
1. Consensus 
2. Units in flux 
3. Conflict-
regulation 
Source: Scanzoni, J., & Szinovacz, M. Family decision making. Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1980. 
Figure 2. A model of explicit family decision making. 
Unit I 
1. Initiator (who raises the issue) (Appendix C, 
Item 2) 
2. Substantive point (what is being said; proposition 
made, etc.) (Appendix C, Items 4, 4A) 
3. Supporting actions (strategies used to support the 
position) (Appendix C, Items 5 through 13; 15 
through 18) 
4. Importance of position to party speaking (Appendix 
C, Item 14) 
5. Response of Other 
A. "Yes" (Discovery of consensus; Unit I ends.) 
B. "Yes, but" (Development of consensus) Go to Unit II 
C. "No" (Conflict) 
Source: Adapted from Scanzoni and Szinovacz, 
1980, pp. 54, 56; Hill, 1981, p. 40. 
Figure 3. Process-variable units. 
Unit II 
2. What is being said by Other (Appendix 
C, Items 21.A, 21.B) 
3. Supporting actions by Other (Appendix 
C, Items 22 through 30; 32 through 35) 
4. Importance of position to Other 
(Appendix C, Item 31) 
5. Response of initiating spouse (Appen­
dix C, Items 38 and 39) 
A. If "yes," unit ends. 
B. If "yes, but," units continue. 
C. If "no," units continue. 
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were assessed by the conjoint interview (Appendix C). The interview 
included the possibility for four units to be developed. 
The first step in the unit included the initiator who raised an 
issue. The second step entailed what proposition or demand was made. 
Third and fourth steps were strategies used to support the position 
(supporting actions) and the importance of the matter to Actor, res­
pectively. Response of Other was the fifth step. See Figure 3 for 
explanation of interview (Appendix C) items which measure unit steps . 
The response of Other determined whether additional units were 
necessary. If Other responded "yes," the result was the discovery of 
consensus and the termination of units. Either a "yes, but" or "no" 
response led to negotiation and the progression to another unit and 
repetition of steps two through five. The development of Unit III 
and Unit IV are dependent on the responses in step five of the 
previous unit similar to the ones mentioned for unit one above. 
According to Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) , strategies fall into 
one of three categories—(1) verbal persuasion (Appendix C, Items 
5 through 10), (2) coercion (Appendix C, Items 11, 12, 15, and 16), 
and (3) violence (Appendix C, Items 17 and 18). 
Dependent Variables 
Process power was defined as the relative ability of the members 
of the dyad to affect or resist change in relationship to the indivi­
dual salience of the matter. Figure 4 illustrates the measurement, 
coding, and calculation of process power. 
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Figure 4 
Process Power 
Unit I (Appendix C) 
(Items 2 through 4.A) 
(Items 21.A, 21.B) 
Unit II (Appendix C) 
(Items 21.A, 21.B) 
(Item 31) 
(Items 38, 39) 
(Item 14) 
Steps 1 and 2 - Initiator (Actor) 
makes request 
Step 5 - Response of Other 
If "yes," Code +1, +2, or +3 
for Actor. Code 0 if no request 
for change was made, or no solution 
offered. 
If "yes, but" (Actor made at least 
a partial gain) Code +1, +2, or +3. 
If "yes, but" (Actor made no gain) 
Code -1, -2, or -3. 
If "no," (No gain for Actor) 
Code -1, -2, -3. 
Step 2 - Other offered proposition. 
Step 4 - Importance of matter 
(Code 1 - only somewhat important; 
Code 2 - important; Code 3 - very 
important) 
Step 5 - Response of Actor 
If "yes," Code +1, +2, +3 for Other 
Code 0 if no request for change was 
made, or no solution offered. 
If "yes, but," (Other made at least 
a partial gain) Code +1, +2, or +3. 
Step 4 
Code 1 
Code 2 
Code 3 
If 
Importance of matter* 
Only somewhat important 
Important 
Very important 
"yes, but," (Other made no gain) 
Code -1, -2, or -3. 
If "no," (No gain for Other) 
Code -1, -2, or -3. 
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Units III, IV, and so on, coded in an identical fashion. 
Total Process-Power Score 
1. Actor and Other's scores across units were summed. 
2. Wife's total score was subtracted from husband's total score. 
3. Higher positive scores indicated process power in favor of the 
husband. 
4. Negative scores indicated process power in favor of the wife. 
*A11 gain or loss scores are coded 1, 2, or 3 in relationship to the 
importance of the matter as indicated in Step 4. 
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The final process-power score indicated the relative power of 
the couple unit. Higher positive scores indicated process power in 
favor of the husband and lower negative scores represented process 
power in favor of the wife. Asymmetrical power (unequal power) 
existed when the process-power score deviated from zero. The 
farther from zero, the greater the degree of asymmetry. Zero scores 
were indicative of symmetrical power (equal power). 
Each member of the dyad received a gain (+) or loss (-) score 
based .on the acceptance (+), rejection (-), projected alteration (+, 
if gain), or no request made or offered (0) of spouse's response (see 
Figure 4). Gain and loss scores were coded numerically in accordance 
with "importance of the matter;" one (only somewhat important), two 
(important), and three (very important). 
Process Outcomes 
Measurement of process outcome was obtained by responses to Item 
4 in the closing questionnaire (Appendix D) (see Figure 5). Possible 
outcome scores were placed on the following continuum: (1) Consensus 
(a) complete agreement (Appendix D; respondent indicated total agree­
ment in Item 4); (2) units in flux; (b) discussion or negotiation 
continues (Appendix D, Item 4.A), (2.C.) agree to disagree (Appendix 
D, Item 4.B), (3) conflict-regulation; (d) one person keeps trying to 
talk; the other does not want to talk (Appendix D, Items 4.C, 4.D); 
and (3.E) one person effectively keeps the other person from continu­
ing to talk (Appendix D, Items 4.C, 4.F). 
1. Consensus 2. Units in Flux 3. Conflict Regulation 
Complete agreement b. Discussion or c. Agree to d. One party e. One party 
following decision­ negotiations Disagree keeps trying effectively 
making process are continuing (Appendix to negotiate; keeps the 
(Appendix D; res­ (Appendix D, D, Item the other other party 
pondent indicated Item 4.A). 4.B) . does not from con­
total agreement (Appendix D, tinuing 
in Item 4). Items 4.C or negotia­
4.D). tions 
(Appen dix 
D, Items 
4.E or 
4.F) . 
Code 4 for l.A. Code 3 for 2.B. Code 2 for 2.C. Code 1 for 3.D. Code 0 for 3.E 
Source: Adapted from Scanzoni and Szinovacz, 1980, p. 97. 
Figure 5. A continuum of decision-making outcomes. 
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Decision making was considered on a continuum from consensus 
to regulation (see Figure 5). "Resolution [consensus] represents 
effective' decision making while regulation represents ineffective 
decision making" (Hill, 1981, p. 43). Outcome l.A (consensus) was 
coded 4 and others were coded in descending order to zero for 3.E 
(conflict-regulation). The response of the spouse whose score 
indicated an outcome closest to the end of the continuum (conflict-
regulation) served as the outcome response for the dyad. The 
rationale was that if either spouse indicated that negotiations had 
been inhibited, then there was little evidence that an outcome 
toward agreement had occurred. In other words, as long as one 
spouse perceived a lack of consensus, dyadic consensus outcome was 
impossible. 
Subjective Outcomes 
Subjective outcomes were measured by responses to Item 1, 
Appendix D. Responses were summed for total individual scores. 
Higher scores indicated satisfaction with the decision-making process 
outcomes, while lower scores indicated resentment. Scale scores on 
resentment items a, b, c, f, j, 1, and o were reversed so that the 
above-mentioned scoring could be accomplished. In order to develop 
a continuum from satisfaction to resentment, items g, h, i, and k 
were deleted. The decision was made that those items represented 
resignment and would be inappropriate for the continuum established. 
Husbands' and wives' scores were added, with higher total scores 
indicative of high dyadic satisfaction and lower scores representa­
tive of dyadic resentment (see Figure 6). 
*Satisfaction - d, e, m, n, p. q, r. 
Resentment -f, 1, o, a, b, c, j 
*Letters represent responses to Item 1, Appendix D. 
Resentment Satisfaction 
0 56 
Figure 6. Subject-outcome continuum. 
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Independent Variables 
Context variables. The five context variables were measured by 
the confidential questionnaire (Appendix B). 
(1) Tangible resource variables included each spouse's educa­
tion, occupation, and income. 
a. Education was defined and coded as highest number of 
years of school. Disparities were computed by sub­
tracting wife's score from husband's score. (See 
Appendix B, Item 6 for measure of education.) 
b. Occupation was defined and coded according to the 
Duncan Occupational Scale. Disparities were computed 
by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. 
(See Appendix B, Item 8 for measure of occupation.) 
c. Income disparities were calculated by the subtraction 
of wife's income from husband's income. (See Appendix 
B, Item 10 for income measure.) 
(2) The self-esteem variable was defined as the way people 
evaluate themselves and was measured by the Rosenberg Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Hill (1981) used the instrument in a 
similar study because of its brevity and efficiency as a 
self-report measure of self-esteem, as well as its construct 
validity. A test-retest reliability of .85 was reported. 
Disparities were computed by subtracting wife's score from 
husband's score. Scores on each item were summed to obtain 
a self-esteem score. Higher scores indicated high 
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self-esteem and low scores indicated low self-esteem. 
Disparities were calculated by subtracting wife's score 
from husband's score. (See Appendix B, Item 15 for self-
esteem measure.) 
The sex-role .preference variable was defined as desired 
goals or interests concerning specific rewards and costs 
related to division of labor and sex stratification. Sex-
role preference was measured by the sex-role preference 
inventory (Scanzoni, 1980). According to Scanzoni, the 
scale has face validity in addition to conceptual and 
theoretical validity. Disparity scores were computed by 
subtracting husband's score from wife's score. Spouse 
individual scores were summed. Higher scores indicated 
nontraditional attitudes, while lower scores illustrated 
traditional attitudes. (See Appendix B, Items 13 and 16.) 
Household characteristics included age, number of marriages, 
and length of marriage (Appendix B, Items 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
Length of marriage was the variable used in the study as an 
independent variable. 
The marital-satisfaction variable was measured by a single 
response on a continuum from completely satisfied to com­
pletely dissatisfied. According to Spanier (1976), respon­
dents' ratings of personal marital satisfaction is a valid 
and reliable technique. Higher scores indicated high 
marital satisfaction. In order to calculate disparities, 
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wives' scores were subtracted from husbands' scores (see 
Appendix B, Item 22 for marital-satisfaction measure). 
The mutuality variable. This variable was defined as an indivi­
dual's evaluation of prior decision making with spouse. Conceptually, 
mutuality scores indicated spouse's estimation of Other's (1) cooper-
ativeness, (2) trustworthiness, (3) fairness, and (4) empathy. Res­
ponses on Items 17, 18, and 19 (Appendix B) were summed to obtain an 
overall mutuality score. Disparities in husband/wife scores were 
calculated by subtracting wife's score from husband's score. Higher 
scores indicated high mutuality, and lower scores represented lower 
mutuality. 
Hypotheses 
Process Power 
H^ Among the predictors investigated, disparity in sex-role 
preference scores will predict the largest proportion of 
the variance in process power in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
H£ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the second largest proportion of the 
variance in process power in dual-career couples' decision 
making. 
Process Outcomes 
H^ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance 
in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making. 
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Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role 
preference scores will predict the second largest proportion 
of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
Subjective Outcomes 
H,- Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income 
will predict the largest proportion of the variance in 
subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision 
making. 
Hg Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the 
variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
Process Variables 
The higher the sex-role preference total score of the 
dual-career couple, the more individualistic types of 
verbal strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation 
or discussion about a disagreement. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The following chapter presents a description of the sample, 
major findings of the study, and a discussion of the results. 
Hypotheses are stated and findings which confirm or disconfirm them 
are given. 
Demographic Results 
As was evidenced by high incomes and upper educational and 
occupational statuses, subjects were representative of the upper-
middle-class socioeconomic group. The majority of couples were in 
the young-to-middle adult age level. Range of ages was from 27 years 
to 65 years (mean = 40 years). The average age for wives was 38.6 
years, while that for husbands was 42.8 years. 
Of the subjects, 18 (36%) husbands and 19 (37%) wives reported 
one previous marriage. No subject had been married more than two 
times (see Table 1). Years married ranged from one to 38 years 
(mean = 12.7 years). 
Twenty-five couples had from one to five children under 18 years 
of age currently living with them (mean = 1.32 children). Of the 
couples who had children in the home, the following frequencies 
occurred: (1) 13 (52%) had one child; (2) eight (32%) had two 
children; (3) three had three children (12%); and one (4%) had five 
children. (see Table 1.) 
Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Husbands and Wives 
Wives Husbands Total 
Characteristics N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage 
Second Marriages 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Children Under 18 Years 
One 
Two 
Three 
Five 
Total 
Educational Levels 
High School Diploma 
Some College 
College Degree 
Graduate Work or 
Master's Degree 
19 
32 
51 
2 
4 
20 
16 
37 
63 
100 
4 
8 
39 
31 
18 
33 
51 
2 
7 
17 
15 
35 
65 
100 
4 
14 
33 
29 
37 
65 
102 
13 
8 
3 
1 
25 
4 
11 
37 
31 
36 
64 
100 
52 
32 
12 
4 
100 
4 
11 
36 
30 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Wives 
Characteristics N Percentage N 
Educational Levels (Continued) 
Law, Medical, Ph.D. 
Degrees 9 18 10 
Total 51 100 51 
Occupational Ranks* 
24-39 1 2 2 
40 - 55 11 21 11 
56 - 71 23 47 19 
72 - 87 14 29 16 
Total 49 100 48 
Hours Worked Per Week 
25 - 29 3 6 0 
30 - 40 8 16 1 3 
41 - 50 25 51 22 
51 - 60 12 25 12 
61-70 1 2 1 
Total 49 100 48 
Husbands Total 
Percentage N Percentage 
20 
100 
19 
102 
19 
100 
6 
21 
40 
33 
100 
3 
22 
42 
30 
97 
3 
23 
43 
31 
100 
0 
27 
46 
25 
2 
3 
21 
47 
24 
2 
3 
22 
48 
25 
2 
100 97 100 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Wives Husbands Totals 
Characteristics N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage 
Incomes for Husbands and Wives 
Less Than $14,999 5 11 3 7 8 9 
$15,000 - $24,999 16 35 9 20 25 27 
$25,000 - $34,999 16 35 8 17 24 26 
$35,000 - $44,999 4 9 13 28 17 19 
$45,000 - $54,999 3 6 6 13 9 10 
$55,000 - $64,999 0 0 3 7 3 3 
$65,000 - $74,999 1 2 2 4 3 3 
$75,000 - $84,999 1 2 1 2 2 2 
$85,000 - $94,999 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Over $100,000 0 0 1 2 1 1 
Totals 46 100 46 100 92 100 
*Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI) used for coding occupational ranks. Stevens and 
Featherman (1981). 
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Highest educational levels of husbands were (1) high school 
diploma, two (2%); (2) some college, seven (14%); (3) college degree, 
17 (33%); (4) some graduate work or master's degrees, 15 (30%); and 
(5) law, medical, or Ph.D. degrees, ten (20%). Wives' educational 
levels were (1) high school diploma, two (4%); (2) some college, 
four (8%); (3) college degree, 20 (39%); (4) some graduate work or 
master's degree, 16 (31%); and (5) law, medical, or Ph.D. degree, 
nine (14%). (See Table 1.) 
All of the couples met the criteria for dual-career status in 
terms of high and continuous commitment to a career. Five indivi­
duals indicated no current employment (three husbands and two wives), 
but in all cases, the interruption of career was considered temporary. 
Two husbands had experienced business failures and were in the pro­
cess of establishing new careers, while one was searching for employ­
ment. One of the unemployed wives was completing requirements for 
the Ph.D., and the other was seeking employment. 
According to the Duncan Index (SEI) , occupational rank covered 
a range from 24 to 87 (mean = 66.07) for husbands and 65.91 for 
wives (see Table 1). Among the wives, 76 percent held occupational 
levels above the 56 level, which indicated professional-type 
careers. Among the husbands, 73 percent held professional occupa­
tions above the 56 (professional) level. 
The number of hours worked (see Table 1) ranged from 25 hours 
to 70 hours. The majority of both spouses (mean for husbands = 
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47.9 hours; mean for wives = 47 hours) worked 40 to 50 hours per week. 
Eight (16%) women and 13 (37%) men reported between 30 and 40 hours 
on the job weekly. Among spouses, 48 percent specified a 41 to 50-
hour workweek. However, 25 percent of husbands and wives worked 51 
to 60 hours weekly. Only one husband and one wife indicated a 61 
to 70-hour work schedule (Table 1). 
The average income for wives was $25,000 to $30,000, and for 
husbands, it was $35,000 to $40,000 (Table 1). Husbands earned 
approximately 27 percent more income than did their wives. When 
combined, 53 percent of husbands' and wives' combined incomes fell 
in the $15,000 to $34,999 range (Table 1). 
Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (Nie et al., 19 75). Procedures used were multiple regres­
sion and analysis of variance. A significance level of .05 was 
required for acceptance of hypotheses and all statistical results. 
The multiple regression technique was used to determine the 
best predictor among the previously listed independent variables of 
the dependent variables. In order to test the hypotheses, a separate 
regression was run for each of the dependent variables. In addition 
to the defined independent variables, the dependent measure, power 
process, was entered as an independent variable in the regression 
for the dependent measure, process outcome. Similarly, the dependent 
variables, power process and power outcome, were submitted as 
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independent variables along with the previously specified independent 
variables in the multiple regression for the dependent measure, sub­
ject ive out come. 
A one-way analysis of variance was performed on the data for 
sex-role preference scores (see Appendix B, Items 13 and 16) (total 
score for spouses summed) by the use of the verbal strategy, "It is 
best for me." (See Appendix C, Items 7B and 24B.) Scheffe"'s test 
(alpha level .05) was used as an a posteriori contrast test to 
specify group mean differences. 
Distribution of Responses 
Independent and Dependent 
Measures 
Table 2 contains the means, ranges, and standard deviations for 
all of the dependent and independent measures. The mean for process 
outcome (PO) was 2.3 which indicated that the average score on the 
continuum of decision-making outcomes (see Figure 5) was between 
discussion or negotiation continuing ("We are still talking") and 
"agree to disagree." 
The positive process power (PP) score (mean = 1.18) indicated 
that husbands had a slight advantage in the power arena. The subjec­
tive outcome mean of 91.2 was representative of high satisfaction 
scores for the couple as a unit. Sex-role preference disparity 
scores (mean = 4.16) were indicative of wives' attitudes toward sex 
roles being higher than those of husbands. 
Table 2 
Means, Ranges, and Standard Deviations for 
Independent and Dependent Measures 
Variable N Mean Range SD 
Process Outcome (PO) 49 2.30 0 - 3 1.0 
Process Power (PP) 50 1.18 -6 - 6 2.6 
Subjective Outcome (SO) 44 91.2 56 -112 13.6 
Sex-Role Preference Disparity (SRD) 50 4.16 -8 - 19 7.0 
Education Disparity (ED) 51 -0.20 -5 - 6 2.6 
Occupation Disparity (OD) 46 0.19 -50 - 38 19.6 
Income Disparity (IND) 43 2.07 -4 - 9 3.1 
Self-Esteem Disparity (SED) 51 -1.90 -19 - 8 6.6 
Marital-Satisfaction Disparity (MSD) 51 -0.08 -5 - 3 1.6 
Mutuality Disparity (MUD) 46 -0.46 -59 - 81 26.2 
Length of Marriage (LM) 51 12.18 1 - 38 10.17 
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The mean scores of wives' sex-role preference scores was 36.23 
and husbands' mean scores were 31.01. These means support, the 
expected result that women have higher sex-role preference scores 
(more nontraditional) than do husbands. However, it should be 
pointed out that the husband and wife means suggest that both are 
more nontraditional than traditional. 
Wives held higher educational levels by a small margin (mean = 
-0.20), while husbands had an equally small margin of higher occupa­
tional status (mean = 0.19). Higher incomes were reported by hus­
bands (IND mean = 2.07), and wives reported higher self-esteem 
scores (SED mean = -1.90). Wives were only slightly more satisfied 
with their marriages than were husbands (mean MSD = -0.08). Mean 
scores on marital satisfaction were almost equal for husbands (4.686) 
and wives (4.765), and were high for both. Mutuality disparities 
were small (MUD = -.46) with wives expressing more feelings of 
mutuality toward husbands than vice versa. 
Process Variables 
In response to Questions 1, 1A, and IB of the interview (see 
Appendix C), "What is the one thing you disagree about most often?" 
14 categories of issues were identified. Table 3 lists the frequen­
cies for each response. 
The issues disagreed about most often were (1) children (N = 13), 
(2) money (N = 11), (3) time (N =6), (4) personal habits (N = 4), 
(5) household tasks (N = 4), (6) purchase of an item (N = 4), and 
(7) communication (N = 2). One couple each stated that the following 
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Table 3 
Issues Disagreed About Most Often by 
Dual-Career Couples 
Issues N Percentage 
Discipline of Children 13 25 
Money 11 21 
Time 6 12 
Personal Habits 4 8 
Household Tasks 4 8 
Purchase of an Item 4 8 
Communication 2 4 
Socialization 1 2 
Religion 1 2 
Status of Women 1 2 
Sex 1 2 
Jealousy 1 2 
Relations With Kin 1 2 
Vacation Choice __1 2 
Totals 51 100 
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were areas they disagreed about most often: (1) socialization, (2) 
religion, (3) status of women, (4) sex, (5) jealousy, (6) relations 
with kin, and (7) vacation choice. 
Fourteen couples claimed they had no disagreements in response 
to Question 1 (Appendix C) . When asked Question 1A (Appendix C) , 
"Thinking back to your recent past, what was the one thing you dis­
agreed about most often," 12 of the 14 were able to identify an 
issue of disagreement from the past. Finally, in response to Ques­
tion IB, the remaining two couples found an area about._which they 
had disagreed. 
Test of Hypotheses 
Correlations Among Independent 
and Dependent Variables 
A correlation matrix of the independent and dependent variables 
is presented in Table 4. Figure 7 presents a path analysis for the 
correlation matrix among independent and dependent variables. ED 
was positively related to LM; LM was positively related to OD; and 
IND was positively related to IND. IND, SRD, and PO were positively 
related to SO, and MUD was negatively related to SO. SRD and MUD 
were negatively related to PP, and OD was positively related to PP. 
MSD was positively related to MUD. 
Table 4 
Correlation Matrix Among Independent and Dependent 
Variables 
PP PO SO ED OD IND SED SRD MSD MUD LM 
PP .01 -.12 .10 .30 .15 .13 -.45 .06 -.21 .02 
PO .30 .05 -.08 -.02 .04 .08 .15 -.02 .04 
SD -.08 .06 .21 -.13 .40 .10 -.22 -.06 
ED .43 .17 -.05 -.11 -.08 -.05 .41 
OD .34 .05 -.16 -.16 -.15 .22 
IND .20 -.03 -.11 -.08 -.08 
SED -.22 -.14 -.11 -.16 
SRD .01 .21 .14 
MSD .29 .19 
MUD 
LM .18 
ho 
SRD 
MSD <: ^ MUD 
*Only those variables which had a correlation of at least .21 were included 
Figure 7. Path analysis for correlations matrix among independent and 
dependent variables. 
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Process Power 
Among the predictors investigated, disparity in sex-role 
preference scores will predict the largest proportion of 
the variance in process power in dual-career couples. 
^ Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the 
variance in dual-career couples' decision making. 
The eight independent variables—(1) length of marriage (LM) , 
(2) income disparity (IND) , (3) sex-role preference disparity (SRD), 
(4) marital-satisfaction disparity (MSD), (5) self-esteem disparity 
(SED), (6) mutuality disparity (MUD), (7) occupational status dis­
parity (OP), and (8) education disparity (ED)—were entered into a 
multiple regression analysis with process power (PP) as the depen­
dent variable. Table 5 reports the results of this analysis. These 
eight variables taken together yielded a multiple R of .58, which 
explains 30 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. 
Overall, T was significant at the .05 level. 
SRD (fi = .41) was the only variable with a significant T score 
(]3<.05). Consequently, hypothesis 1 was supported and accepted. 
SRD scores were negatively related to process power which indicated 
that low SRD couples experienced higher husband power. Although the 
T score was not significant, the second best predictor of process 
power was occupational-status disparity (jB = .226). The third best 
predictors were mutuality disparity (p = .135) and marital satisfac­
tion disparity Q3 = .133). Hence, hypothesis 2 was rejected. 
Table 5 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors of 
Process Power in Dual-Career 
Decision Making 
Variables Beta 
Length of Marriage (LM) 
Income Disparity (IND) 
Sex-Role Disparity (SRD) 
Marital Satisfaction Disparity (MSD) 
Self-Esteem Disparity (SED) 
Mutuality Disparity (MUD) 
Occupational-Status Disparity (OD) 
Education Disparity (ED) 
(Constant) 
Analysis of Variance for Total Equation 
Source 
Regression 
Residual 
SS 
99.936 
233.444 
df 
9 
23 
.015 
.081 
-.151 
.221 
.009 
-.014 
.031 
-.071 
1.465 
MS 
12.492 
5.558 
.061 
.087 
-.405 
.133 
.023 
-.135 
.226 
-.071 
2.248** 
.392 
.613 
-2.898* 
.949 
.169 
-.964 
1.454 
- .456 
*£C .01 
**p *.05 
Multiple R = .5475 R Square = .2997 Standard Error = 2.3575 
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Process Outcomes 
Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance 
in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making. 
Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role 
preference scores will predict the largest proportion of 
the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
In addition to the eight independent variables which were used 
to test hypotheses 1 and 2, process-power scores were entered also 
into a multiple regression analysis with process outcome (PO) as the 
dependent variable. 
The nine variables in combination produced a multiple R of .24 
whoch explained five percent of the variance in the dependent vari­
able. The overall F was not significant; thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 
were not supported. Beta weights for marital satisfaction disparity, 
sex-role preference disparity, and education disparity were .176, 
.142, and .12 7, respectively. Although these were the highest beta 
weights, none had significant T scores; therefore, no application of 
results was possible. 
Subjective Outcomes 
Hj. Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income 
will predict the largest proportion of the variance in sub­
jective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making. 
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Hg Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the second largest proportion of the 
variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
Process power (PP) scores and process outcome (PO) scores were 
added to the eight independent variables to test hypotheses 5 and 6 
with subjective outcome (SO) as the dependent variable. Table 6 
presents the results of the analysis. The ten variables combined 
yielded a multiple R of .64, which explained 41 percent of the vari­
ance in the dependent variable. Overall F was significant at the 
.01 level. 
SRD (JS = .42) and MUD (J5 = .343) had a significant T score at 
the .01 level. IND (JB = .268) was significant at the .05 level. 
Among the independent variables entered in the regression, SRD, MUD, 
and IND in descending order were the best predictors of SO. Conse­
quently, hypothesis 5 was rejected, and hypothesis 6 was accepted. 
The relationship of SRD with SO was positive and indicated that 
the higher the sex-role preference disparity of the dual-career 
couple, the more satisfactory were the subjective outcomes of deci­
sion making. MUD had a significant negative relationship to SO (j>< 
.01). The lower the mutuality disparity in dual-career couples, the 
more satisfaction the dyad expressed toward the subjective outcomes 
of decision making. 
The significance level of the positive relationship between IND 
and SO was .05. The interpretation was that couples with high income 
disparity have high satisfaction with the subjective outcomes of 
Table 6 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Predictors 
of Subjective Outcome 
Variables B Beta 
Length of Marriage (LM) 
Process Power (PP) 
Process Outcome (PO) 
Income Disparity (IND) 
Marital Satisfaction Disparity (MSD) 
Self-Esteem Disparity (SED) 
Mutuality Disparity (MUD) 
Education Disparity (ED) 
Sex-Role Disparity (SRD) 
Occupational Status Disparity (OD) 
(Constant) 
Analysis of Variance for Total Equation 
Source SS df 
Regression 3300.164 10 
Residual 4593.722 40 
-.079 -.064 -.441 
-.086 -.018 -.123 
3.000 .240 1.930*** 
1.197 .268 2.004** 
1.408 .175 1.301 
-.230 -.122 -.945 
-.173 -.343 -2.590* 
-.256 -.053 -.359 
.771 .423 2.941* 
-.027 -.040 -.266 
79.168 
MS F 
330.016 2.8736* 
114.843 
*£<..01 Multiple R = .6466 R Square = .4181 Standard Error = 10.7165 
**p <.05 
***£< .06 
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decision making. Although the significance level of process outcome 
(£<.06) was slightly above that which was acceptable, it was close 
enough to warrant consideration. The relationship of PO and SO was 
positive; therefore, couples who rated themselves near the consensus 
end of the process-outcome continuum were more likely to have high 
subjective outcome scores which represented high satisfaction. 
A path analysis was developed (see Figure 8) to further explain 
the relationship of selected context variables to subjective outcome. 
The analysis indicates that SRD and MUD have a positive relationship, 
while MUD and SO are negatively related and SRD and SO are positively 
related. SRD is negatively related to PP, and PP is negatively 
related to SO. In other words, the greater the SRD, the less the PP. 
IND is positively related to SO so that the greater the IND, the 
higher the satisfaction score on SO. Likewise, PO has a positive 
relationship with SO; therefore, the higher the PO scores, the 
higher SO. PO is negatively related to SO; hence, lower PP scores 
correlate with high SO scores. MUD is negatively related to PP and 
indicates that low MUD correlates with high PP. 
Process Variables 
The higher the sex-role preference total score of the dual-
career couple, the more individualistic types of verbal 
strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation or dis­
cussion about a disagreement. 
Sex-Role Disparity 
B .343 Mutuality Disparity' S, Subjective 
Out come 
40 (Couple) 
Process 
Power B .405 Process 
Outcome 
Income Disparity 
+ or - indicates the direction of the relationship. 
B = Beta weights from multiple regression. 
C = Correlation from matrix for dependent and independent variables. 
Figure 8. Path analysis for subjective outcome. 
o 
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A one-way analysis of variance was applied to determine the 
relationship between sex-role preference scores total (SRPT) for 
the individual couples (see Appendix B, Items 13 and 16), and the 
use of the verbal strategy, "It is best for me" (see Appendix C, 
Items 7 and 24) by at least one spouse, neither spouse, or both 
spouses. Group One of the independent variable-, BM, consisted of 
couples in which both spouses responded "yes" to the question, "Do 
you ever use the reason it is best for me?" while discussing their 
disagreement over an issue. Group two was made up of couples in 
which both spouses responded "no" to the above item. In group three, 
one spouse answered "no" and the other answered "yes." 
Table 7 reports the means and standard deviations on SRPT for 
the three groups. Group one (N = 23) had a mean SRPT of 70.13; 
group two (N = 14) had a mean SRPT of 62.07; group three (N = 13) 
had a mean SRPT of 64.15. The total mean for all groups (N = 50) 
was 66.32. 
Table 8 presents the one-way analysis of variance of mean SRPT 
for groups one, two, and three. The results indicated that there was 
a significant difference between the SRPT for the three groups, and 
the null hypothesis was rejected and hypothesis 7 was accepted. 
The Scheffe test was applied to find the confidence interval 
for the .05 level of significance. Results are reported in Table 9. 
Groups one (both use BM) and two (both do not use BM) had signifi­
cantly different (£<.05) SRPT scores. Couples in which both part­
ners used BM while negotiating or discussing a matter of disagreement 
72 
Table 7 
SRPT Means and Standard Deviations for 
Groups One, Two, and Three* 
Groups ** N Mean SD 
Group One 23 70.13 8.05 
Group Two 14 62.07 7.42 
Group Three 13 64.15 8.70 
Totals 50 66.32 8.69 
*SRPT was computed by adding husbands' and wives' scores on sex-
role preference (Appendix B, Items 13 and 16). 
**Group One - Both spouses use the verbal strategy, "It is best for 
me" in negotiation or discussion. 
Group Two - Both spouses do not use the verbal strategy, "It is 
best for me" in negotiations or discussions. 
Group Three - One spouse uses the statement above and the other 
does not. 
Table 8 
Analysis of Variance of Mean SRPT 
for Groups One, Two, and Three 
Source SS df MS F 
Between Groups 647 2 323 4.99* 
Within Groups 3049 47 
Totals 3696 49 
*]3_ < .01 
Table 9 
Scheffe's Test of Group Means and Differences 
Between Group Means at the .05 Level 
of Significance 
Means for Groups 
One Two Three Difference Scheffe Test .05 Significant 
70 62 8 5.7 p .05 
70 64 6 5.7 No 
62 64 2 5.7 No 
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had higher (more nontraditional) sex-role preference attitudes, while 
those where both spouses did not use BM had lower (more traditional) 
sex-role preferences. 
Discussion 
As was expected, the dual-career couples in this study repre­
sented the upper-middle class with total incomes averaging $64,000 
annually. With both spouses working 40 to 50 hours per week, it was 
no surprise that time was one of the issues disagreed about most 
often. Several researchers (Bebbington, 1973; Rapoport & Rapoport, 
19 78; St. Johns-Parsons, 19 78) pointed to time management and lack 
of time as one of the most stressful aspects and costs of the dual-
career lifestyle. 
The high process-outcome scores, high subjective-outcome scores, 
and high marital-satisfaction scores of these couples indicated that, 
in spite of the stressful nature of this type of lifestyle, the 
majority of these couples implement effective decision-making pro­
cesses and have had some success at working out disagreement satis­
factorily. 
As was mentioned earlier, division of household tasks is one 
of the areas of concern for dual-career couples. The participants 
of this study substantiated previous findings as household tasks was 
one of the issues disagreed about most often. Subjects who initiated 
the disagreement over household tasks were in all cases wives who 
wished husbands to participate more. This confirms the previous 
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findings of researchers (Perrucci et al., 1978; Pleck, 1979; 
Weingarten, 19 78; Yogev, 1981) who concluded that dual-career wives 
participate more in household chores than do dual-career husbands. 
There was some overlap with household task issues and time 
management. For example, some of the time conflicts were related to 
not having enough time to complete household tasks. Since both 
spouses in these couples work similar hours each week, the Blood and 
Wolfe (1960) argument that husbands participate less at home because 
of fewer resources such as time was not supported. Neither were 
Yogev's (1981) findings supported that dual-career husbands spent 
more hours on their careers than did wives. 
Contrary to the expectation that dual-career couples would dis­
agree about childcare, the primary focus on the child issue was 
disagreements over discipline in lieu of care. Part of the explana­
tion for this is that the average age of the couples was 38 to 40 
years, and that most of the children were older and required less 
care but required a great deal of decision making by parents. In 
addition, 36 percent of the sample had been married previously and 
lived with stepchildren. Therefore, several of the disagreements 
cited concerned the discipline or relationship with stepchildren. 
Money was the issue of concern for 21 percent of the couples. 
Even though the average income of couples was $64,000, and scarcity 
of the resource was not a problem, decision making about expenditures 
was a problem. 
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Process Power and Sex-Role 
Preference 
The results of this study supported the statements of Scanzoni 
and Szinovacz (1980) that the dynamics of male-female relationships 
can be best investigated through a "focus on sex roles and decision 
making" (p. 10).' Sex-role preference was found to be an important 
variable throughout the study. 
Hill (1965) pointed out that marital decision making was "one 
of the most important (if not equivalent to) indicators of marital 
power" (p. 22). The present study confirmed this notion by the 
rp«;ults of the multiple regressions in which eight independent vari­
ables were successful in the prediction of process-power scores which 
emerged from the decision-making process. 
The mean power-process score for couples was 1.18 which indi­
cated that husbands had higher power than wives by a small margin. 
Yogev (1981) suggested that one reason for the acceptance of unequal 
power by dual-career wives was that the unequal roles enabled them 
(the wives) to continue in their traditional roles. 
Resource Theory 
Even though husbands in the present study had higher overall 
incomes than did wives, no evidence was found in support of the 
Blood and Wolfe resource theory. Neither income, education, nor 
occupational status was correlated with process power. This investi­
gation substantiated Scanzoni's (19 79) discussion of power in which 
the point was made that some researchers have found that increases 
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in the husband's economic resources either decreased or had no 
effect on his power and that the wife's employment had no influence 
on her power. 
Rodman's "normative-resource theory" which was based on the 
assumption that marital power is affected by not only the resources 
of the marital dyad, but also on cultural norms concerning marital 
power was tested by Burr et al. (1977). Conclusions were that 
resources were strongly related to power when norms concerning 
authority were more patriarchal than egalitarian. These dual-career 
couples were generally nontraditional and had a more egalitarian 
lifestyle than patriarchal lifestyle. Perhaps, for this reason, 
tangible resources were ineffectual in the prediction or influence 
of power in these dual-career couples. 
One of the most important findings was that sex-role preference 
disparity was the best and the only statistically significant predic­
tor of power. This result substantiated the conclusions of Hoffman 
(1960) that employment affects power structure indirectly by inter­
action "with the pre-existing ideologies and personalities of the 
actors" (p. 35). 
The negative direction of the relationship suggested that when 
couples were similar on sex-role preferences, higher power in the 
relationship went in the direction of the husband. This finding 
would be expected for those couples in which both spouses are more 
traditional (have lower SRP scores), but become more difficult to 
explain in those cases where both spouses are nontraditional. The 
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speculation is that couples in this study who had lower sex-role 
disparity scores were traditional; hence, the negative relationship 
of sex-role disparity and process power. 
Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) pointed out that in those couples 
in which sex-role preference disparities are high, the wife usually 
has the more nontraditional score and that conflicts are more likely 
to occur. These dual-career wives had highly nontraditional sex-role 
preferences; thus, one would expect that where large disparities in 
SRP existed, the wife was more often the nontraditional of the two. 
Perhaps, in those couples who have large disparities in sex-role 
preferences, the wife is less likely to relinquish power to the 
husband and is more likely to respond to the husband's requests for 
change negatively. Therefore, in those couples, the husband would 
have less power. 
Subjective Outcome 
According to Scanzoni and Hill (1982), "Resignation/resentment 
are . . . predicted by disparity over income (most strongly), 
mutuality, and sex-role preferences, and also strongly by objective-
outcome disagreements" (p. 20). Thepresent investigation found 
similar results from the multiple regression in which subjective 
outcome was the dependent measure. Subjective outcome was predicted 
best by the same variables mentioned above, only the strongest pre­
dictor was sex-role preference disparity instead of income disparity. 
The positive nature of the relationship indicated that the greater 
the disparity, the higher the satisfaction toward the outcomes of 
decision making. 
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As was mentioned earlier, one would expect wives in couples with 
large sex-role preference disparities to be more nontraditional. 
Concomitant with the previous finding that large sex-role preference 
disparities predicted reduced husband power, perhaps the present 
result indicates that these couples are satisfied with this arrange­
ment . 
The significant negative relationship between mutuality dis­
parity and subjective outcome were expected. When couples view each 
other as trustworthy, fair, empathetic, and cooperative in prior 
decision making, then they naturally express positive feelings of 
satisfaction over the outcomes of decision making. To put it 
another way, it is difficult to be resentful toward someone with 
whom one has had fair and equitable dealings in the past. This 
finding supports the exchange - theory of the "principle of recipro­
city." 
Income disparity had a significant and positive relationship 
with and was the third best predictor of subjective outcome. Hus­
bands in the study claimed higher incomes than did wives; therefore, 
in high-income disparity, the husband usually had the higher income. 
This disparity probably means that the husband not only has a 
higher income than the wife, but that the income for the family is 
high in general. Higher income families can often solve problems 
through the ability to afford entities which provide solutions. For 
example, at least one-half of the couples who disagreed about house­
hold tasks negotiated and found consensus by hiring outside help. 
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Consequently, subjective outcomes have a good chance to be satis­
factory when couples have the means to solve some problems in this 
way. Were this income not available, the couple would be forced to 
deal with the disagreement between themselves, and could result in 
less satisfactory and more resentful outcomes. 
Sex-Role Preference and 
Verbal Strategies 
Several authors have pointed out the correlation of the types 
of verbal strategies used to influence partners during the negotia­
tion process with sex-role preference (Scanzoni & Szinovacz, 1980; 
Scanzoni & Polonko, 1980; Hill & Scanzoni, 1982). Those individuals 
with more modern sex-role preferences are more likely to use "it is 
best for me" as a guiding philosophy in the decision-making process 
than are more traditional individuals who are likely to use the 
verbal strategy, "it is best for others (BO)." 
The results of a one-way analysis of variance indicated that 
group one which consisted of couples where both used BM was signifi­
cantly different from group two which was made up of individuals 
where neither of the partners used BM. Findings were that group one 
had higher sex-role'preference total scores (SRPT) (more modern) 
than did group two. Therefore, the theories mentioned above were 
supported by the present analysis. Modern couples were more likely 
to use BM than traditional. In other words, modern individuals 
seek personal rewards and are willing to bargain in their own 
interest with partners. 
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Summary of Results 
- Three of the seven hypotheses were supported by the data. The 
independent variables in combination predicted a significant amount 
of the variance in the dependent variables, process power and subjec­
tive outcome. 
As was expected, sex-role preference disparity was the best 
predictor of process power. Occupational-status disparity and 
mutuality disparity were the second and third best predictors, res­
pectively. 
The independent variables in addition to process power were 
unsuccessful in predicting power outcomes. Therefore, hypotheses 
3 and 4, which stated that mutuality disparity and sex-role prefer­
ence disparity would predict the largest portion of the variance in 
process outcomes, were rejected. 
The variance in the dependent variable, subjective outcome, 
was best predicted by sex-role preference disparity and mutuality 
disparity. Hypothesis 6, which stated that mutuality disparity 
would be the second best predictor, was supported. Hypothesis 5, 
in which income was expected to be the best predictor of subjective 
outcome, was rejected. 
A one-way analysis of variance supported hypothesis 7 which 
stated that couples with higher sex-role preference total scores 
would use more individualistic verbal strategies than would those 
with low scores. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to assess which of a group of 
independent variables (context variables) were most predictive of 
the following dependent variables: (1) process power (PP) , (2) pro­
cess outcome (PO) , and (3) subjective outcomes (SO) of decision mak­
ing in dual-career families. The eight independent variables were 
sex-role preference disparities (SRD), self-esteem disparities (SED), 
mutuality disparities (MUD), marital-satisfaction disparities (MSD), 
income disparities (IND), education disparities (ED), ̂occupational 
status disparities (OD), and length of marriage (LM). 
The purposive sample consisted of 52 (N = 101) dual-career 
couples. Thirty-seven of the wives were members of a professional 
women's group, and 14 of the wives were members of the Junior League 
of Greensboro, North Carolina. 
A process-oriented model of joint decision making which was 
developed by Scanzoni and Polonko (1980) and Scanzoni and Szinovacz 
(1981) served as a basis for the questionnaires and interviews used 
in the study. Data were gathered by self-report questionnaires 
(see Appendices B and D) and a conjoint tape-recorded interview 
(see Appendix C). Context variables were obtained from the confi­
dential questionnaire (see Appendix B), and process variables were 
measured by the interview (Appendix C). Context variables were (1) 
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measures of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), (2) sex-role preference, 
(3) marital satisfaction, (4) household characteristics (age, number 
of marriages, length of marriage), (5) income, (6) occupational 
status (Stevens & Featherington, 1981), and (7) educational status. 
In addition, mutuality scores which measured degrees of trust, 
equity, empathy, and cooperativeness couples had for each other 
based on evaluations of prior decision making, were obtained from 
the confidential questionnaire. Couple-disparity scores were cal­
culated by the subtraction of wives' scores from husbands' scores on 
each variable except sex-role disparity in which the husbands' 
scores were subtracted from the wives' scores. 
Process variables entailed (1) who initiated an issue, (2) the 
proposition which was made, (3) supporting strategies, (4) importance 
of the matter, and (5) response of the reactor. A process-power 
score for the couple was calculated by the response of each spouse 
to the other in conjunction with a score based on the saliency of 
the issue. 
Process outcome was measured by spouse responses in the closing 
questionnaire (see Appendix D, Item 4) to where they thought they 
ended on a continuum from consensus to conflict regulation (see 
Figure 5). Subjective outcome was measured by responses to an item 
(Appendix D, Item 1) concerning how they felt about the disagree­
ment they had described in the interview. 
Statistical procedures used to analyze the data were multiple 
regression and analysis of variance. Results indicated that both 
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partners in the couples scored high on the following variables: (1) 
educational levels, (2) occupational status, (3) incomes, (4) mari­
tal satisfaction, (5) mutuality scores, (6) subjective-outcome 
scores, and (7) modern sex-role preferences. 
Seven hypotheses were tested. Below are the hypotheses state­
ments and results: 
Among the predictors investigated, disparity in sex-role 
preference scores will predict the largest proportion of 
the variance in process power in dual-career couples. 
H2 Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the 
variance in dual-career couples' decision making. 
Of the eight independent variables mentioned above entered in a 
multiple regression, SRD was the best predictor of the dependent 
variable, process power. The eight variables taken together 
explained 30 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (F = 
JD <.05). SRD had a significantly negative relationship with process 
power at the .05 level. 
Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the largest proportion of the variance 
in process outcomes in dual-career couples' decision making. 
Among the predictors investigated, disparities in sex-role 
preference scores will predict the second largest proportion 
of the variance in process outcomes in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
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In addition to the eight independent variables which were used 
to test hypotheses 1 and 2, process-power scores (PP) were also 
entered into a multiple regression analysis with process outcome 
(PO) as the dependent variable. The overall F was not significant; 
thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported. 
H,. Among the predictors investigated, disparities in income 
will predict the largest proportion of the variance in 
subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' decision 
making. 
Hg Among the predictors investigated, disparities in mutuality 
scores will predict the second-largest proportion of the 
variance in the subjective outcomes in dual-career couples' 
decision making. 
PO and PP were added to the eight independent variables to test 
hypotheses 5 and 6 with subjective outcome (SO) as the dependent 
variable. The ten variables combined explained 41 percent of the 
variance in the dependent variable. Overall F was significant at 
the .01 level. SRD had a significant positive (]3 <.01) relationship 
with SO; MUD had a significant negative (p^.01) relationship with 
SO, and IND had a significant positive (£<C.05) relationship with SO. 
The higher the sex-role preference total score of the dual-
career couple, the more individualistic types of verbal 
strategies will be used by the dyad in negotiation or dis­
cussion about a disagreement. 
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A one-way analysis of variance was applied to determine the 
relationship between sex-role preference total (SRPT) for the indivi­
dual couples and the use of the verbal strategy, "It is best for me" 
(BM) by both spouses (group one), neither spouse (group two), or at 
least one spouse. Results indicated that there was a significant 
difference (£<.01) between the SRPT for the three groups. The null 
hypothesis was rejected, and hypothesis 7 was accepted. 
Results from Scheffe's test indicated that groups one and two 
had significantly (£<.05) different SRPT scores. Couples in which 
both partners used BM had higher (more nontraditional) SRPT scores 
than did those in which both spouses did not use BM and had lower 
(more traditional) SRPT scores. 
Conclusions 
The results of this study have demonstrated that sex-role pre­
ferences are the single most important variable in the study of the 
process of marital decision making. As sex roles continue to change 
and dual-career couples increase in number, sex-role preferences 
will take on an ever-increasing importance in the study of the 
family. 
Findings point to disparities in sex-role preference attitudes 
as the best predictors of power. Those women with modern sex-role 
preferences are more likely to be involved in a career and conse­
quently, may have power more equal to that of their spouses. This 
effect of employment on power is indirectly affected by the sex-role 
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preference. Therefore, it is recommended that sex-role preferences 
and decision making be included in any studies of family power. 
No evidence was found in support of Blood and Wolfe's resource 
theory. Neither income disparities nor other tangible resource 
disparities were predictive of process power. 
One of the most important indicators of marital power is 
marital decision making. The successful prediction of power by a 
combination of variables from a decision-making model illustrates 
that power can most effectively be studied through the process of 
decision making. 
The findings of this research indicated' that mutuality and 
subjective outcomes are a salient issue in the study of decision 
making, because they affect future decision making. The negative 
significant relationship of mutuality disparity to subjective out­
come suggested that prior decision-making history was salient for 
subsequent decision making. 
Conclusions are that the process model of joint decision making 
is an effective method for the study of the actual processes of 
decision making. One of the strengths of the model is that it con­
siders the couple as a unit. The model is a distinct improvement 
over the final-say technique whereby outcomes are viewed as static 
entities, because it encompasses the dynamics of family relation­
ships and interactions. 
4 
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Family Research Center 
Department of Child Develop­
ment and Family Relations 
University of North Carolina 
Greensboro, NC 27412 
Dear Member of the Forum: 
As you know from a recent Forum newsletter, the Forum's executive 
board voted unanimously to cooperate with the Family Research Center 
of UNC-G in carrying out some important research. And if you were 
at the September Forum meeting, you will recall I took a few moments 
of time to explain the purpose of the research. As I said on that 
occasion, we are all aware that relationships between women and men 
are changing rapidly these days. As a result, how women and men 
actually work out their decisions becomes very important. Right 
now, we know very little about the ways in which achieving business 
and professional women work out decisions with the men in their 
lives. For women who are currently married, this means their hus­
bands; for women who are not currently married, it means the man who 
is at present, or who was most recently, the most important man in 
their lives. 
In a few days, one of our courteous and professional interviewers 
will be calling you. If you are married, s/he will arrange a time 
when it is convenient for her/him to come to your home. At the 
appointed hour, our interviewer will ask each of you separately to 
fill out a brief questionnaire. Then the interviewer will ask you 
and your husband together to respond to a few questions. In order 
to help us keep track of three people talking at once, and to make 
sense of the information as we analyze it later on, we have found 
that it helps to tape record these conversations. The entire session 
takes around 35 minutes, and people we've interviewed in the past 
tell us it was an enjoyable and very interesting experience. We are 
sure that after your interview you will feel the same way. 
We have found that some women who are not currently married, or else 
not living with their husbands, nonetheless have a male friend with 
whom they often have to work out important decisions. If you have 
such a friend, our interviewer would like to have the same kind of 
session with you and your friend as I described above for married 
couples. 
We have also found that although some women do not currently have a 
male friend with whom they work out important decisions, during the 
past they had a husband or friend with whom they did. If that 
applies to you, our interviewer would like to talk to you (without 
involving that person) about your decision making with that person. 
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All Forum women (and their husbands and friends) may be completely 
assured of total confidentiality and anonymity. No connection is 
ever made between you and your individual answers. Instead, res­
ponses from all persons are grouped and analyzed together. You are 
familiar with newspaper reports of percentages of people who give 
their opinions about certain matters. It is those percentages we 
are interested in, because it is that information that helps us make 
recommendations for community programs to enrich the quality of -
American family life. 
We very much appreciate your part in contributing to healthier family 
experiences. If you have questions at all either before or after the 
interview, please call me at 379-5315. 
Thank you again for your kind cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
John Scanzoni 
Professor 
JS :ph 
P.S. Please do not discuss the contents of the interview until after 
all Forum members have been interviewed. Thanks—early next 
year I will be happy to share our findings with the Forum. 
APPENDIX B 
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Confidential Questionnaire 
Before we ask a few questions of you and your husband and wife 
together, we would like t.o take a few minutes to complete this 
questionnaire. 
There are no right or wrong answers. We only want to know your 
opinions about things. 
Feel free to answer each question as truthfully as you can because 
your husband or wife will not see what you have put down. 
The questions we are going to ask you and your husband or wife 
together are different from these questions so that your husband 
and wife will not know what you have said in these pages. 
Please answer each question by putting a circle around the number 
that best fits what you want to say. 
If the meaning of the word is not clear, please answer the question 
in the best way you know how. > 
If instructions (IN CAPITAL LETTERS) are not clear, please ask me 
and I will explain them. 
And, of course, you know that everything you say will be held in 
absolute confidence. You are completely anonymous as far as the 
results are concerned. Your answers are placed with many others 
and analyzed statistically. You will never be connected with your 
answers. 
Thank you! We know you will find this experience an interesting one! 
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1. Are you: 
MALE 0 
(or) 
FEMALE 1 
2. On what month, day, and year were you born? 
DAY MONTH YEAR 
3. Have you ever been married before? 
YES 0 (CONTINUE) 
NO 1 (SKIP TO Q 5) 
4. How many times? 
NUMBER 
5. On what month, day, and year did your (present) marriage begin? 
MONTH DAY YEAR 
6. How far did you go in school—what was the highest grade or level 
of you you completed? 
HIGHEST GRADE 
7. Do you currently have a regular paying job? 
YES 0 (CONTINUE) 
NO 1 (SKIP TO Q 11) 
8. What kind of work do you do? What are the main things you do 
on your job? 
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8A. When did you start the job you now hold—what month and year? 
MONTH YEAR 
9. How many hours per week do you usually work at your present job? 
HOURS 
10. Here is a list of yearly incomes different people have. Please 
circle the letter of your own (not your partner's) estimated 
1982 income. Please give the gross figure—before taxes, etc., 
and including income from salaries, rents, royalties, dividends, 
etc. 
a. Less than 14,999 k. 60,000 - 64,999 
b. 15,000 - 19,999 1. 65,000 - 69,999 
c. 20,000 - 24,999 m. 70,000 - 74,999 
d. 25,000 - 29,999 n. 75,000 - 79,999 
e. 30,000 - 34,999 o. 80,000 - 84,999 
f. 35,000 - 39,999 P- 85,000 - 89,999 
g- 40,000 - 44,999 q .  90,000 - 94,999 
h. 45,000 - 49,999 r. 95,000 - 99,999 
i. 50,000 - 54,999 s. Over 100 ,000 
j. 55,000 - 59,999 
11. Are there any children under 18 years of age currently living 
at home with you? 
YES 0 (CONTINUE) 
NO 1 (SKIP TO Q 13) 
12. IF YES TO Q 11: How many children now live with you at home? 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
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13. Please circle whether you strongly agree, agree, have mixed 
feelings, disagree, or strongly disagree about each of the 
following statements as they apply to a mother. 
a. A mother should realize that 
her greatest rewards and 
satisfaction in life come 
through her children. 
b . A mother of preschool 
children should work only if 
the family really needs the 
money a whole lot. 
c. A working mother should give 
up her job whenever it makes 
a hardship for her children. 
d. There should be more daycare 
centers and nursery schools 
so that more mothers of pre­
school children could work. 
e. If being a mother is not 
satisfying enough, she should 
take a j ob . 
f. A mother of preschool child­
ren should not work because 
it is not good for the child. 
g. A mother with preschoolers 
should be able to work as 
many hours per week as their 
father. 
CO <U. !>> a) 
RH <30 A) T-H AI 
00 E U too u a AI 0) T3 •H 60 E 00 
O 0) <U <U RH CFL o to 
U U N X a) CFL M (0 4-1 £>0 to •H a) •H JJ •H 
CO <| < S A W © 
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Please circle how often you do each of the following religious 
experiences, or have these religious feelings. 
a. Attending religious services. 
b. Engaging in prayer. 
c. Encouraging others to turn to religion. 
d. Participating in a church social 
activity. 
<u CO 
4J QJ 
<4-1 e o •H e 
e 4-1 o (-i 
0) 3! T3 <D 
M •u e rH > o (U (U 
> o C/5 CO S3 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
e. Listening to or watching religious 
broadcasts. 0 2 3 4 
f. Reading the Bible. 0 2 3 4 
g- Feeling that God loves you. 0 2 3 4 
h. Have something that you call a 
religious experience. 0 2 3 4 
3 4 
10Q 
Here are some ways people describe themselves. Do you strongly 
agree, agree, have mixed feelings, disagree, or else strongly 
disagree about each statement as it applies to you personally? 
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a. On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself. 0 12 3 4 
b. At times, I think I am no good at 
all. 0 12 3 4 
c. I feel that I have a number of 
good qualities. 0 12 3 4 
d. I am able to do things as well as 
most people. 0 12 3 4 
e. I feel I do not have much to be 
proud of. 0 12 3 4 
f. I certainly feel useless at times. 0 12 3 4 
g. I feel that I am a person of worth 
at least on an equal plane with 
others. 0 12 3 4 
h. I wish I could have more respect 
for myself. 0 12 3 4 
i. All in all, I am inclined to feel 
that I am a failure. 0 12 3 4 
j. I take a positive attitude toward 
myself. 0 12 3 4 
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Please circle whether you strongly agree, agree, have mixed 
feelings, disagree, or strongly disagree about each of the 
following statements as they apply to a father. 
>> CO a) a) rH 60 a) rH <U 00 e P 60 M 
6 CD <u T3 -H 60 C 60 0 a) <D a) r-H (fl o to M n u X (1) en l-l CO 
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a. The father should be the main 
financial support of his 
children. 
b . The father should spend as 
much time as the mother in 
looking after the daily needs 
of his children. 
c. The father should be the 
children's main disciplinarian. 
d. The father has the special 
responsibility to discipline 
the children firmly. 
e. The father has a special 
responsibility to set an 
example' to his children of 
leadership and assertiveness. 
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How well does each of the following statements describe your 
husband/wife when you and he/she disagree about something that 
is important to him/her? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THE FIVE NUMBERS 
FOR EACH STATEMENT. 
Does NOT 
Describe 
h/h 
At All 
He/she says or does 
something to hurt my 
feelings 
0 
h. He/she tries to avoid 
talking about it 0 
i. He/she comes right out and 
tells me how he/she is 
feeling 0 
j. He/she gets cool and dis­
tant, gives me the cold 
shoulder 0 
k. He/she tries to work out a 
compromise 0 
1. He/she tries to smooth 
things over 0 
m. He/she tries to reason 
wi th me 
DOES 
Describe 
h/h 
Very Well 
b. He/she gets really mad 
and starts yelling .... 0 1 2 3 4 
c. He/she gets sarcastic . . 0 1 2 3 4 
d. The more we talk, the 
madde r  h e / s h e  g e t s  . . .  . 
e. He/she gets up and walks 
o u t  • • • • • • • • • • •  
f. He/she takes a long time 
to get over feeling mad. . 
g. He/she clams up, holds in 
his/her feelings 
4 
4 
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Does NOT 
Describe 
h/h 
At All 
n. He/she listens to what 
I have to say and tries 
to understand how I 
feel 0 
o. He/she does something to 
let me know she/he really 
loves me even if we 
disagree 0 
p. He/she wants what is best 
for him/herself without 
really considering my pre­
ferenc e s  a n d  ne e d s  . . . .  0 
q. He/she wants what is best 
for me, without really 
considering his/her own 
preferences and needs . . 0 
r. He/she wants to balance 
what is best for him/her 
with what is best for me . 0 
DOES 
Describe 
h/h 
Very Well 
12 3 4 
12 3 4 
12 3 4 
12 3 4 
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18. How well do each of the following statements describe your 
husband/wife 'in general? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THE FIVE NUMBERS 
FOR EACH STATEMENT. 
Does NOT DOES 
Describe Describe 
h/h h/h 
At All Very Well 
a. She/he is primarily 
interested in his/her 
own welfare 0 1 2 3 4 
b. There are times when 
she/he cannot be trusted. 0 1-234 
c. She/he is perfectly 
honest and truthful 
with me 0 1 2 3 4 
d. She/he can be trusted 
completely 0 1 2 3 4 
e. She/he is truly sincere 
in his/her promises ... 0 1 2 3 4 
f. She/he does not show me 
enough consideration . . 0 1 2 3 4 
g. She/he treats me fairly 
and justly 0 1 2 3 4 
h. She/he can be counted on 
to help me 0 1 2 3 4 
i. She/he nearly always knows 
exactly what I mean ... 0 1 2 3 4 
j. She/he usually senses or 
realizes what I am feeling 0 12 3 4 
k. She/he realizes what I 
mean when I have diffi­
culty saying it 0 1 2 3 4 
1. She/he usually understands 
the whole meaning of what 
I say to him/her .... 0 1 2 3 4 
m. She/he appreciates exactly 
how the things I experi­
ence feel to me 0 1 2 3 4 
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How TRUE is each of the following statements in describing how 
you feel about your husband/wife? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF THE FIVE 
NUMBERS FOR EACH STATEMENT. 
NOT True VERY 
At All True 
a. I find it difficult to 
express my true feelings 
to him/her 
b. I feel entirely safe in 
telling him/her about my 
weaknesses 
c. There is nothing impor­
tant that she/he does 
not know about me . . . 
d. I can ask him/her any­
thing 
e. I can express both good 
and bad feelings to him/ 
h e r  • • • • • • • • • •  
0 12 3 4 
0 12 3 4 
0 12 3 4 
f. I am able to share pri­
vate things face-to-face 
with him/her 0 1 2 3 4 
g. I can be honest with 
him/her 0 1 2 3 4 
h. I am open with him/her 
about things I am afraid 
of 0 1 2 3 4 
i. I feel I can confide in 
him/her about almost 
everything 0 1 2 3 4 
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Which of the following statements best describes how you feel 
about the FUTURE of your relationship with your husband/wife? 
ON THE LINE BELOW, PLEASE MARK THE LETTER OF THE STATEMENT THAT 
BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU FEEL. 
a. I want desperately for my relationship to succeed, and would 
go to almost any lengths to see that it does. 
b. I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do 
all I can to see that it does. 
c. I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do 
my fair share to see that it does. 
d. It would be nice if my relationship succeeded, but I cannot 
do much more than I am doing now to help it succeed. 
e. It would be nice if it succeeded, but I refuse to do any 
more than I am doing now to keep the relationship going. 
f. My relationship can never succeed, and there is no more that 
I can do to keep the relationship going. 
LETTER 
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Now we would like you to think about your married life over the 
last two months, and use the following words and phrases to 
describe it. For example, if you think that your marriage 
during the last two months has been very miserable, put an X in 
the box right next to the word "miserable." If you think it 
has been very enjoyable, put an X in the box right next to 
"enjoyable." If you think it has been somewhere in between, 
put an X where you think it belongs. PUT AN X IN ONE BOX ON 
EVERY LINE. 
Miserable • • • • • • • En j oyab le 
Hopeful • • • • • • • Discouraging 
Free • • • • • • • Tied Down 
Empty • • • • • • • Full 
Interesting • • • • • • • Boring 
Rewarding • • • • • • • Disappointing 
Does not give 
me much chance 
• • • • • • • Brings out the 
best in me 
Lonely • • • • • • • Friendly 
Hard • • • • • • • Easy 
Worthwhile • • • • • • • Useless 
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All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied have you 
been with your marriage over the last two months? Place an X 
in the box that best describes how satisfied you have been. 
• • • • • • • 
Completely 
Satisfied Neutral 
Completely 
Dissatisfied 
APPENDIX C 
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Conjoint Interview 
The guidelines for the next part of our time together are very 
simple. For example, I will ask you (TURN TO ONE SPOUSE) some ques­
tions about your decision making, but while I am doing that, you 
(TURN TO OTHER) should feel free to interrupt, or break in, at any 
point and help out your spouse in case she/he has forgotten some 
detail, or you think what she/he is saying should be said in a 
little different way. Next, after asking you (FIRST SPOUSE) some 
questions, I will ask OTHER a few, and OTHER should feel free to 
interrupt and help out at any point, just as FIRST did. In summary, 
what we would like to have is an interesting and lively discussion 
which comes as close as possible to the ways in which you actually 
work out your marriage decisions. 
Ill 
i 
We have found that in every relationship, the partners now have, or 
have recently had, one or more disagreements. The partners tell us 
the disagreements cover many different areas. For example, the dis­
agreements may be over money—people say their partner spends too 
much or too little, or uses money in the wrong ways. Often there 
are disagreements about employment—what job to take, and whether 
partners spend too much time working. Other disagreements partners 
tell us about include where to live, which partner should do which 
chores around the house, as well as matters of affection, sex, and 
companionship—such as spending too little time together. Other 
partners tell us they often disagree over who should take care of 
the children—or spend time with them; they also disagree over 
personal habits, or visiting friends and relatives, or religion, 
and so on. The list of possible disagreements is almost endless. 
1. Thinking of your own relationship, what would you say is the one 
thing you currently disagree about most often. That one thing 
does not have to be on the list I just read—instead, the dis­
agreement can include anything at all. With that in mind, what 
would you say is the one thing you disagree about most often? 
(SKIP TO Q 2) 
1A. IF COUPLE SAYS, "We have no current disagreement ..." READ: 
Couples who tell us they have no current disagreements, tell 
us about disagreements they had in the recent past. Thinking 
back to your recent past, what was the one thing you dis­
agreed about most often? 
(SKIP TO Q 2) 
IB. IF COUPLE SAYS, "We have never had any disagreements . . ." 
READ: 
Some couples do tell us they have never had any disagree­
ments, and we are very interested in how they are able to do 
that. To help us understand, I would like to have you play 
act for us how you usually make a decision over some impor­
tant area of your marriage. Take, for example, the matter 
of companionship—how much time you should spend together. 
Suppose one of you felt you needed to spend more time 
together. Which one of you would be more likely to bring 
up that sort of matter? 
(USE RESPONSE CATEGORIES IN Q2, AND CONTINUE.) 
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Couples tell us that one person usually brings up the disagree­
ment more often than the other in order to discuss it. In your 
relationship, which one of you usually first brings up the dis­
agreement over ? 
WIFE 0 
(INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ 
HUSBAND 1 CATEGORIES.) 
BOTH EQUALLY 2 
If "Wife" OR "Husband" is response to Ql, turn to that particular 
PERSON AND GO TO Q3. 
IF "Both Equally" IS RESPONSE, TURN TO WIFE AND BEGIN AT Q3. 
When was the last time you brought up the matter of your disagree­
ment over ? 
DAYS AGO WEEKS AGO MONTHS AGO (DO NOT READ.) 
What exactly did you say to your partner in connection with your 
disagreement over ? For example, what changes did 
you want, and so forth? What was your opinion, or point of view, 
and how did you present it? 
4A. Is there anything else you said specifically while present­
ing your point of view regarding your disagreement over 
? 
Partners tell us that at the same time they bring up the disagree­
ment itself, they also say and do several things to help each 
other see their point of view. The first of these things is to 
give facts, figures, and other details about the disagreement— 
but they do not try to influence the other person to see their 
point of view, or to get them to change their minds. For exam­
ple, couples who are trying to decide about buying a car try to 
say something about the payments, how much gas mileage they can 
expect, and so forth. Or if they are trying to decide about a 
job for one partner or the other, they give facts on salary, 
hours, and so forth. When you are discussion your disagreement 
over , would you say you try to provide a lot of 
facts and figures about it, do you provide some information, 
little information, or no information at all? 
A LOT 0 SOME 1 LITTLE 2 NONE 3 (SKIP TO Q7) 
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6. Exactly what kind of information do you give to your partner? 
7. Partners tell us that they often go one step beyond merely pro­
viding information to their partners. In addition, they also try 
to influence, or help, the other person to see their point of 
view. They often try to influence them by giving them reasons 
such as those listed on CARD A. (HAND CARD A TO PARTNERS.) As 
I read each one, please tell me if you ever use that reason 
while discussing your disagreement over with your 
partner. 
YES NO 
a. It is best for the children. 0 1 
b. It is best for me. 0 1 
c. It is best for your partner. 0 1 
d. It is only right and fair. 0 1 
e. It is your partner's responsibility. 0 1 
f. It is best for the family. 0 1 
,8. Are there any other reasons you use to try to influence your 
partner to see your point of view while discussing 
YES 
NO (SKIP TO Q10) 
9. IF YES TO Q8, What are these reasons? 
10. Please tell me which of the above reasons you use most often 
to help influence your partner to see your point of view. 
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11. Another thing that persons do to try to help influence their 
partner to see their point of view is to make promises such as, 
"If you do this, then I will do that," and so on. While you 
are discussing your disagreement over , would you say 
you make promises like that? 
VERY OFTEN 0 
OFTEN 1 
SOMETIMES 2 
SELDOM 3 
NEVER 4 (SKIP TO Q13) 
12. What exactly do you say when you make those kinds of promises 
in connection with your disagreement over ? 
13. Another thing that persons do to try to help or influence part­
ners see their point of view is to tell them how important the 
matter is to them. When you are discussing your disagreement 
over , would you say you tell your partner how 
important the matter is to you? 
VERY OFTEN 0 
OFTEN 1 
SELDOM 2 
SOMETIMES 3 
NEVER 4 
14. How important to you personally is the point of view you men­
tioned earlier in connection with your disagreement over 
? Is your point of view: 
VERY IMPORTANT 0 
IMPORTANT 1 
ONLY SOMEWHAT 
IMPORTANT 2 
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15. Another thing that persons do to help influence partners see 
their point of view is to make certain statements such as, "If 
you do not stop doing this, then I will not stop or start some­
thing else you might want," and so on. While you are discussing 
your disagreement over , would you say you make 
statements like that: 
VERY OFTEN 0 
OFTEN 
SOMETIMES 
SELDOM 
NEVER? 
1 
2 
3 
4 (SKIP TO Q17.) 
16. What exactly do you say when you make those kinds of statements 
in connection with your disagreement over ? 
17. Another thing persons do to influence partners to see their 
point of view is to use certain strong words, or do certain 
strong things, such as those that appear on CARD B. As I read 
each one, please tell me if you ever use it while discussing 
your disagreement over ? 
YES NO 
a. Get mad or angry. 0 
b. Raise your voice. 0 
c. Get up and leave the room. 0 
d. Get your partner to, feel guilty. 0 
e. Get your partner to feel selfish. 0 
f. Get your partner to feel ashamed. 0 
g. Swear. 0 
h. Call your partner "dumb" or "stupid." 0 
i. Throw things. 0 
j. Slap or hit. 0 
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YES NO 
k. Cry. 0 1 
1. Pout, or feel hurt. 0 1 
18. Please tell me the letter of the thing on CARD B that you use 
most often in connection with your disagreement over 
LETTER FROM Q17 
19. TURN TO PARTNER REACTOR 
Since there are always two sides to every disagreement, I would 
first of all like to ask you if you would say that everything 
your partner (name) has said so far is accurate; or would you 
say that there are some things she/he has said which in your 
opinion need to be changed in some way? 
ACCURATE 0 (SKIP TO Q21) 
NEED TO BE CHANGED 1 
20. What specific things that she/he said need to be changed? 
21. Your partner says that his/her point of view over is 
that (Q4, 4A) . (ASK INITIATOR IF THAT IS CORRECT STATEMENT.) 
When she/he says that, what do you say in response? Specific­
ally, how is your point of view or opinion on your disagreement 
over different from his/hers? 
21A. What exactly did you say to your partner in connection 
with your disagreement over ? 
2 IB. Was there anything else that you added? 
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22. While you are discussing your disagreement over with 
your partner, how much information (facts, figures, details) 
do you provide? Do you provide: **»!•>.' 
A LOT 0 
SOME 1 
A LITTLE 2 
NONE? 3 (SKIP TO Q24) 
23. Exactly what kind of information do you give to your partner? 
24. Which of the reasons on CARD A do you use to help or influence 
your partner to see your point of view while you are discussing 
your disagreement over with him/her? Do you say: 
YES NO 
a. It is best for the children. 0 1 
b. It is best for me. 0 1 
c. It is best for him/her. 0 1 
d. It is only right and fair. 0 1 
e. It is his/her responsibility. 0 1 
f. It is best for the family. 0 1 
25. Are there any other reasons you use to try to influence your 
partner to see your point of view while discussing ? 
YES 0 
NO 1 (SKIP TO Q2 7) 
26. IF YES TO Q25, what are these reasons? 
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27. Please tell me which of the above reasons you use most often 
to help influence your partner to see your point of view. 
28. In trying to help your partner see your point of view, how 
•often would you say you make promises such as, "If you do this, 
then I will do that," and would you say you make them: 
VERY OFTEN 0 OFTEN., . 1 SOMETIMES 2 SELDOM 3 
NEVER 4 (SKIP TO Q30) 
29. What exactly do you say when you make those kinds of promises? 
30. How often would you say you tell your partner how important the 
mattet you are discussing is to you? Would you say you do that: 
VERY OFTEN 0 
OFTEN 1 
SOMETIMES 2 
SELDOM 3 
NEVER 4 
31. How important to you personally is your point of view in connec­
tion with your disagreement over ? Is your point of 
view: 
VERY IMPORTANT 0 
IMPORTANT 1 
ONLY SOMEWHAT 
IMPORTANT 2 
32. While discussing your disagreement over , how often 
would you say you make statements such as, "If you do not stop 
doing this, then I will not start or stop something you want," 
and so on, in order to help your partner see your point of view? 
Would you say you do that: 
VERY OFTEN 0 OFTEN 1 SOMETIMES 2 SELDOM 3 
NEVER? 4 (SKIP TO Q34) 
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33. What exactly, do you say at those times? 
34. Which of the things on CARD B do you say or do to help or 
influence your partner to see your point of view while dis­
cussing ? 
YES NO 
a. Get mad or angry. 0 1 
b. Raise your voice. 0 1 
c. Get up and leave the room. 0 1 
d. Get your partner to feel guilty. 0 
e. Get your partner to feel selfish. 0 
f. Get your partner to feel ashamed. 0 
8« Swear. 0 
h. Call your partner "dumb" or "stupid." 0 
i. Throw things 0 
j- Slap or hit. 0 
k. Cry. 0 
1. Pout or feel hurt. 0 1 
35 . Please tell me the letter of the thing on CARD B that you use 
most often in connection with your disagreement over 
LETTER FROM Q34 
TURN TO INITIATOR. 
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37. What specific things need to be changed? 
38. In regard to your disagreement over , you say that 
and your partner says . When she/he says 
that, do you make any suggestions for new ideas or compromises, 
or changes, that either of you could make that could help 
settle your disagreement? 
YES 0-
NO 1 (SKIP TO Q40) 
39. What exactly do you say? 
(SKIP TO Q41) 
40. IF NO TO Q38, why do you not make any new suggestions? 
(SKIP TO Q46) 
41. TURN TO REACTOR. Would you say that what your partner has just 
said is accurate, or are there things that need to be changed? 
ACCURATE 0 (SKIP TO Q43) 
CHANGE 1 
42. What specific things need to be changed? 
43. When your partner says those things, do you make any additional 
suggestions for further changes that either of you could make? 
YES 0 
NO 1 (SKIP TO Q45) 
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44. What exactly do you say? 
(SKIP TO Q46) 
45. Why do you not make any additional suggestions? 
46. TO BOTH PARTNERS: 
The last time you finished talking about your disagreement over 
, where would you say you ended up as far as the 
line on CARD C is concerned? Would you say you ended at number 
zero—complete or total disagreement—or were you at a number 
further to the. right—and if so, which number was it? 
47. To finish our time together, I am now going to give each of you 
a brief questionnaire to complete separately from each other. 
Like the questionnaire you completed earlier, your partner will 
not be told what you say on this questionnaire, so you can be 
completely open and honest. But before you do this, is there 
anything that either of you would care to add to any part of 
the discussion we have just had regarding your disagreement 
over ? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
Complete 
Disagreement 
Complete 
Agreement 
APPENDIX D 
CLOSING QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Closing Questionnaire 
We would now like you to take a few minutes to think about the dis­
cussion you just had with your husband/wife. As with the question­
naire you filled out earlier, your husband/wife will not know what 
you say in these pages. 
1. As you are thinking about the discussion we have just had, for 
each of the following items, please circle the number that comes 
closest to describing how you FEEL right now about the things 
you and your husband/wife said to each other. 
NOT How How I 
I Feel DO Feel 
At All 
a. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 
b. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 
c. Hurt 0 1 2 3 4 
d. Closer to him/her and more 
loving than before .... 0 12 3 4 
e. More understanding for 
him/her than before .... 0 1 2 3 4 
f. Resentful 0 1 2 3 4 
g. Resigned 0 1 2 3 4 
h. That talking was a waste of 
time 0 1 2 3 4 
i. That she/he will go ahead and 
do what she/he wants to any­
way 0 1 2 3 4 
j. That she/he will use what 
I've said against me ... 0 1 2 3 4 
k. Sorry for what I said ... 0 1 2 3 4 
1. That she/he tried to pres­
sure me to do what she/he 
wants 0 1 2 3 4 
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NOT How 
I Feel How I 
At All DO Feel 
m. That she/he wants to work 
out something that is 
best for both of us ... . 0 1 2 3 4 
n. She/he understands my point 
of view 0 1 2 3 4 
o. She/he does not realize how 
important the matter of 
disagreement is to me . . . 0 1 2 3 4 
p. She/he showed me how much 
she/he cares about me . . . 0 1 2 3 4 
q. She/he was open about her/ 
his needs and what she/he 
really wants 0 1 2 3 4 
r. Satisfied 0 1 2 3 4 
s. OTHER? PLEASE WRITE IN ANY 
ADDITIONAL FEELINGS YOU 
MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE DIS­
CUSSION WE HAVE JUST HAD. 
Think for a moment about what you and your husband/wife said you 
wanted at the beginning of the discussion. Considering the way 
the discussion went, how much would you say you gained as a 
result of the discussion? 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST DESCRIBES HOW MUCH YOU WOULD 
SAY YOU GAINED. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
NONE OF ALL OF 
WHAT I WHAT I 
WANTED WANTED 
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3. And how much would you say your husband/wife gained as a result 
of the discussion? 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST DESCRIBES HOW MUCH YOU WOULD 
SAY SHE/HE GAINED. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
NONE OF 
WHAT 
SHE/HE 
WANTED 
6 7 8 9 10 
ALL OF 
WHAT 
SHE/HE 
WANTED 
4. In thinking about the matter that you and your husband/wife just 
discussed, where would you say you are RIGHT NOW with regard to 
this specific matter? 
PLEASE MARK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING: 
a. We are still talking about it. 
b. We have agreed to disagree, and not talk about it for a 
while. 
c. I keep talking about it even though my husband/wife does 
not want to. 
d. My husband/wife keeps talking about it even though I do 
not want to. 
e. My husband/wife does not want to talk about it, so I just 
keep quiet. 
f. My husband/wife keeps quiet because he/she knows I do not 
want to talk about it. 
5. All things considered, how fair would you say the situation is 
right now as far as this specific matter is concerned? 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT COMES CLOSEST TO HOW FAIR YOU 
THINK THE SITUATION IS. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9  1 0  
COMPLETELY 
UNFAIR 
COMPLETELY 
FAIR 
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In thinking about this situation, what do you figure is the best 
possible way to settle it in order to make you yourself most 
satisfied? 
What is the best possible way it could be settled in order to 
make your husband/wife most satisfied? 
8. What is the best possible way it could be settled to make 
you both equally satisfied? 
And finally, please add anything else that you can think of about 
how you and your husband/wife try to decide this particular 
matter. 
THANK YOU!! 
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CARD A 
YES NO 
a. It is best for the children. 0 1 
b. It is best for me. 0 1 
c. It is best for your partner. 0 1 
d. It is only right and fair. 0 1 
e. It is your partner's responsibility. 0 1 
f. It is best for the family. 0 1 
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CARD B 
YES NO 
a. Get mad or angry. 0 1 
b. Raise your voice. 0 1 
c. Get up and leave the room. 0 1 
d. Get your partner to feel guilty. 0 1 
e. Get your partner to feel selfish. 0 1 
f. Get your partner to feel ashamed. 0 1 
8- Swear. 0 1 
h. Call your partner "dumb" or "stupid." 0 1 
i. Throw things. 0 1 
j • Slap or hit. 0 1 
k. Cry. 0 1 
1. Pout or feel hurt. 0 1 
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CARD C 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
COMPLETE COMPLETE 
DISAGREEMENT AGREEMENT 
4 
